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PREFACE
This study was undertaken primarily to provide some basic 
research in the field of Montana economic history. The Hope Mining 
Company was chosen for a number of reasons. First, a good deal of 
information was available in the business records of the company at 
the Montana State Historical Society Library at Helena, Montana, and 
in the Letterbooks of James and Granville Stuart at the Montana State 
University Library at Missoula, Montana. Second, silver mining as an 
industry in Montana has been long neglected by writers who concentrated 
on the more romantic gold and copper mining industries. And third, the 
Hope Mining Company provided a good subject for a case history because 
of its long period of active operation in Montana.
The paper is not intended as a history of silver mining in 
Montana, nor even a sophisticated analysis of the Hope Company. If the 
author has made the raw data stored in Helena available to other schol­
ars in some sort of order, he will be most satisfied. It is hoped that 
these data will become more valuable after the business records of the 
Granite Mountain and Bi-Metallic Mining Companies, stored at the Mon­
tana State Historical Society Library, are sorted and compiled in a 
similar manner. The nature of the data and the aim of this paper sug­
gested the chronological organization and quantity of statistical data 
which are included in the text. It is believed that in the present 
form, the paper will best achieve the aim of providing groundwork for 
a larger study of silver mining in Montana.
11
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Obtaining data concerning silver mining for an economic history 
presents unique problems. Although a number of monographs have been 
written on silver mining, a good economic history on the subject does 
not exist. T. A. Rickard’s A History of American Mining remains the 
best single study of mining in the west even though the book is now 
old and written from an engineer's viewpoint. Robert S. Lewis'
Elements of Mining and Theodore J. Hoover's Economics of Mining are 
useful, but again written by engineers. While limited in scope, Clark 
Spence's British Investments and the American Mining Frontier provides 
an excellent account of promotional techniques used in early mining 
ventures. A good deal of information can also be gleaned from the 
older histories of Montana, but these books contain little information 
on economic history, R. W. Raymond has written several valuable books, 
and Alex Del Mar's A History of the Precious Metals from the Earliest 
Times to the Present and Grant H. Smith's The History of the Comstock 
Lode, I85O-I92O would have been useful had they been available.
Periodical articles concerning the economic history of silver 
mining are almost nonexistent. A good deal has been written on the 
silver controversy and gold mining, but most articles on silver mining 
emphasize engineering. Several Government reports do contain valuable 
information, especially W. H. Emmons and F. C. Calkins' Geology and Ore 
Deposits of the Philipsburg Quadrangle Montana for this particular 
study.
The most valuable sources of information used in this study are 
the original papers of the St. Louis and Montana Mining Company, the 
Hope Mining Company, the Granite Mountain Mining Company, S. T. Hauser,
IV
and the Stuart brothers. Without these original records, the study 
would not have been possible. Newspaper accounts provide valuable sup­
plemental information, but financial information contained in newspapers 
must be handled with extreme care.
Appreciation is due the staff of the Montana State Historical 
Society Library at Helena for their cooperation and aid, particularly 
John W. Hakola. And John W. Smurr has given generously of his time and 
patience in guiding me.
D *L*S.
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CHAPTER I
ST. LOUIS AND MONTANA MINING COMPANY, 186^-71
Silver mining in the West presented problems quite different 
from placer mining. A placer mine consisted simply of a shallow hole 
dug into sand or gravel, with the equipment needed to work such a mine 
consisting of a shovel, pick, pan and strong back. Expenditures might 
later be made to construct sluice boxes, tunnel into the deposit, build 
water supply ditches, or employ hydraulic mining methods, but the proc­
ess remained essentially one of removing loose particles of metal from 
alluvial deposits.
Silver mining usually involved removing the metal from veins or 
lodes of quartz. The quartz had to be mined, crushed in some sort of 
mill, processed to recover silver bullion, and the bullion finally 
smelted for purification. Because the processes required in silver 
mining were more complex than placer mining, larger capital outlays 
were required.
Realizing they could not work silver veins without capital, yet 
recognizing their value, many miners claimed silver veins or lodes for 
speculative purposes. The problem for these persons became one of 
finding a buyer or investor for their claims. Because substantial in­
vestment capital did not exist in Montana, the owners of such claims 
had to look elsewhere. The St. Louis and Montana Mining Company drew 
its capital investment funds from St. Louis. The link between Montana 
claim owners and St. Louis investors was supplied by Samuel T. Hauser,
— 1 —
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Hauser was born in Kentucky in 1833, and after becoming a civil 
engineer, he spent eight years working for railroads in Missouri and 
then went to Montana in 1862 with W. B. Dance, In Montana they met 
Granville and James Stuart and Rezin Anderson. These men became the 
Montana stockholders in the St. Louis and Montana Mining Company.
Hauser was a cousin of Luther M. Kennett, and he later married the 
daughter of D. A. January, both of St. Louis. Through these two men, 
access to investment capital was obtained.^
In 1865 Hauser returned to St. Louis with a power of attorney 
to represent a number of Montana claim owners. These persons owned 
claims which averaged two hundred feet on quartz veins or lodes. Each 
claim was too small to be mined itself, but combined they might sell 
for a good price,^
Hauser carried with him a report showing an average assay of 
almost three hundred dollars in silver per ton of ore on six of the 
claims. Pending confirmation of the assay report, a tentative agree­
ment for sale of the claims was reached between Hauser and the Missouri 
Petroleum and Mining Company. The assay results were confirmed and the 
company agreed to pay $50,000 for the claims. Based on the value of
A Newspaper Reference Work (Butte, Montana: Butte Newspaper
Association, 1900), no pagination. For short biographical sketches 
of these man, see Appendix C, p. 8U •
^Miscellaneous Deeds of S, T, Hauser, May 18, 1865,‘in S; T, 
Hauser Papers (Montana State Historical Society Library, Helena, 
Montana). Cited hereafter as Hauser Papers, For a biography of 
this important Montana capitalist, see the forthcoming study by John 
W. Hakola.
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this property, a subsidiary company was formed with $U00 ,00 0 capital 
stock— a sizeable amount of this stock was thus "water"— and the follow-
3ing month a prospectus was issued.^
This new company was styled the Missouri and Montana Mining 
Company, incorporated under the laws of Missouri with John How as pres­
ident, Samuel T. Hauser as vice president, and a board of directors 
consisting of D. A. January, Enno Sander, Alexander Stewart and Samuel 
Gaty. The company issued U,000 shares of stock worth $100 each and 
reserved $150,000 for working capital. The property owned included 
1,000 feet of silver claims in six lodes in the Rattlesnake (Argenta) 
area, UOO feet near Virginia City, UOO feet in the Deer Lodge district, 
and 200 feet near Bannack City— all in the southwestern portion of 
Montana Territory.
According to the prospectus, the future was extremely bright.
The Rattlesnake lodes assayed over $2,000 per ton, while expenses would 
run no more than $23 to $U5 per ton, as in the Washoe and Reese River 
silver mining districts of Nevada. The prospectus showed that if all 
lodes were worked, annual profits would be 39 million dollars— a good 
deal more than the company subsequently earned in more than forty years 
of operation. Montana was a beautiful place, the prospectus continued, 
well adapted to agriculture, and easily accessible at any time during 
the year. The ore veins were three to six times wider than those of 
the Washoe and Reese River districts, mine shafts could be driven to
^Letters of A. K. Eaton to Hauser, April 25; C. C. Backus to 
Hauser, May 31; P- A. Ladue to Hauser, May 13; Memo of Agreement, 
May 28, 1865, Hauser Papers,
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500 feet before the water level was reached-— how this was determined 
is difficult to understand— and the veins became richer as they des­
cended. A large number of people were flowing into Montana, soon to be 
swelled by thousands of soldiers who had "made known their intention to 
proceed at once to the Montana mines" where they could "enjoy all of the 
accustomed pleasures and excitements of camp life." The company had 
scattered claims which, owing to the large investments being made in 
Montana, could be worked or sold at a profit.^ How could the enter­
prise fail?
It is difficult to say whether one should attribute ignorance, 
deception, gross misrepresentation, or to be somewhat kinder, unbridled 
optimism to the author of this prospectus. Certainly the businessmen 
of St. Louis, a city long engaged in trade with the west, were more 
cognizant of actual conditions than this pamphlet indicates. Yet, in 
an age when the giant corporation was an infant and regulation of 
business methods a violation of personal freedom, perhaps none of the 
attributions is correct. If forced to choose among the possible explan­
ations, I would favor optimism. Certainly most persons associated with 
mining during that period were afflicted to a greater or lesser degree 
with the malady known as "mining fever." And, certainly, this optimism 
seemed justified when miners were scurrying from strike to strike, 
often forgetting how short-lived some strikes were, but never forgetting 
that the strikes were made. The prospectus, while flamboyant in
^Prospectus of the Missouri and Montana Mining Company (St. 
Louis ; R. F. Studley & CoTj 1865).
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language and optimistic in tone, was probably as honest as many of 
the period, more honest than some.
The history of this company is unknown. In July, however, a 
second prospectus was issued under the name of the St. Louis and 
Montana Mining and Discovery Company. This pamphlet contained essen­
tially the same information as the Missouri and Montana Mining Company 
prospectus. Except for the opening paragraphs describing real prop­
erty, the second pamphlet quoted directly from the first.
These two companies may never have actually conducted any mining 
operations. They were both subsidiary to the Missouri Petroleum and 
Mining Company. These prospectuses reflected the shifting nature of 
ownership during the summer of 1865 as attempts were made to lure in­
vestors into the venture, and it is doubtful if either company 
continued to exist after the formation of the St. Louis and Montana 
Mining Company in the autumn of 1865.
Hauser negotiated with L. M. Kennett for the latter to act as 
president of the St. Louis and Montana Mining Company and attorney-in- 
fact for Hauser in all matters pertaining to the Missouri Petroleum 
and Mining Company,^ Although not yet formally organized in the fall 
of 1865, the St. Louis and Montana Mining Company sent Augustus Steitz 
to Montana City (Argenta) to construct a smelter.^
The following January the company was formally organized as a 
subsidiary of the Missouri Petroleum and Mining Company with capital
^Prospectus of the St, Louis and Montana Mining Company 
(St. Louisi 1865)•
^For a short biographical sketch of Steitz see Appendix C.,
p. 8U .
stock of $600,0 0 0. The holdings of the company included h,800 feet of 
claims in the Eaton, Savage, Metropolitan, Seeker, Kearsage, Butter­
field, Wadam, St. Louis, Gibraltar, Red Cedar, Golden Gate, Nonpareil, 
Henry Clay, Rothchild, Prolific, Barrow, Great Eastern and Prickly Pear 
lodes— none of these located at Philipsburg. The board of directors 
included an impressive array of St. Louis and Montana owners. To 
oversee operations, an executive committee for Montana was formed con-
O
sisting of Hauser, Walter B. Dance, James Stuart and Rezin Anderson.
When the Missouri River opened in I866, machinery was shipped
to Montana by river steamer. The smelter begun at Montana City
(Argenta) by Steitz in 1865 was partially completed with the help of
Philip Deidesheimer, and in August I866 Steitz began preparations for 
9production.^
The plant at Montana City was not fully completed, however, and 
Steitz needed more money. In late August, Hauser proposed that the 
Montana owners advance eight or ten thousand dollars to insure comple­
tion before winter began as it was too late to request funds from St. 
Louis and get a reply.James Stuart went to Montana City to inspect 
the plant and concluded that Steitz was overly optimistic and suffer­
ing from a "severe attack of quartz on the brain," In spite of this.
7For a list of the directors and shareholders of this and 
other closely related companies see Appendix C, p. 8U.
^The Helena Herald (Helena, Montana), May 2U, 186?, p. 1.
^A Steitz to Hauser, August I6, I866, Hauser Papers, For a 
biographical sketch of Deidesheimer see Appendix C, p. 8U.
^^Hauser to W. B. Dance and James Stuart, August 26, I866, 
Hauser Papers.
he considered Hauser's judgment sound and agreed to advance any sum 
necessary to complete the plant.
Two months later Steitz reported that the hot blast was begin­
ning to disgorge freely, double shifts had been instituted, and the 
two main furnaces completed,The Montana Post said Steitz had about 
sixty men employed at the works which consisted of blast, cupelling 
and roasting furnaces, Scotch hearths and machinery constructed on 
the Freiberg plan used in Germany. After operations began, Steitz
recovered forty pounds of silver from one ton of ore— a promising 
13return.
The smelter continued to operate throughout the winter. Because 
of illness, Steitz was replaced by Deidesheimer, who advised Hauser 
in early I867 that he would continue to operate the works at Montana 
City until Steitz recovered and then proceed to erect the mill planned 
at Philipsburg (Flint Creek). ^
Hauser returned to St. Louis early in 186? to raise more capital 
for the mill planned at Philipsburg, The St. Louis investors agreed 
to allocate $100,000 for development in Montana, while W, B. Dance and 
James Stuart sought to expand the company holdings at Philipsburg.^^
^^James Stuart to Hauser, Sept. lU, 1866, ibid.
^^Steitz to Hauser, October 1, I866, ibid,
^^The Montana Post (Virginia City, Montana), October 6, p. 1, 
^Philip Deidesheimer to Hauser, undated (early I867?), Hauser
Papers.
^^The Helena Herald: Supplement, February 21, 1867, no pagin­
ation. Dance to Stuart, March 20, 1867, Hauser Papers.
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Meanwhile the smelter at Montana City was started by Deide­
sheimer and, although the lining of the furnace caused trouble, the 
operation was successful for a short time. After the furnace lining
was repaired, a considerable amount of ore was smelted, but the
Montana City works were not profitable. Perhaps the major reason for 
failure was the scanty knowledge of smelting processes. In addition, 
there was no market for the lead produced as a by-product, coking
coal was not locally available (the company used charcoal as a substi-
17tute), and transportation was costly. The Montana City works were
1 Rclosed in the summer of 186?~
Of the various reasons for failure, transportation costs are of
special interest. With all her natural riches, Montana was, and to 
some extent remains, geographically isolated from sources of supplies 
and markets. Modern means of transport have alleviated the problem 
but have not remedied it completely. In the l860’s supplies and ore 
could be hauled by wagon to Ft, Benton and shipped via the Missouri 
during the summer months, hauled by wagon some 500 miles south to 
Corrine, Utah, and shipped via the Union Pacific Railroad after 1869, 
or hauled west by wagon over the Mullan road to Walla Walla, Washing­
ton and transshipped via the Columbia River, Any route was costly; 
all required haulage of several hundred miles by wagon through
p. 1.
^^The Rocky Mountain Gazette (Helena, Montana), March 30, 1867,
^̂ R. W. Raymond, Statistics of Mines (New York: J. B. Ford &
Co., 1869), pp. 150-5 1.
S. Keys to Hauser, August 5, I867, Hauser Papers.
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mountainous country. The hardships that could be caused by weather, 
especially in winter, are apparent to anyone familiar with Montana 
where weather conditions are seldom moderate. A further complicating 
factor was the uncertainty of how far supplies had to be freighted by 
wagon if they moved to or from the Missouri, During the winter the 
river was blocked by ice, and in the summer low water often prevented 
steamboats from proceeding beyond Ft. Union near the present day 
Montana-North Dakota state boundary. If the problem of transport had 
been solved, the lack of a lead market and coking coal would not have 
been so crucial.
By mid-1867, construction of the James Stuart mill at Philips­
burg had begun with G, C. Swallow assisting in construction,^^ Samuel 
Gaty replaced L„ M, Kennett as president, and in July 100 men were at
Of)work on the mill under the supervision of James Stuarti While the 
work progressed during the summer of 186?, the investors in St. Louis 
complained about the non-receipt of ore shipments and information con­
cerning local operations. John How told Hauser that the directors 
were tired of promises and lack of information. The company would not 
advance any more funds until progress reports were received. He ended
p “lsaying: "I write you wishing I had never heard of Montana."
19The Rocky Mountain Gazette, June 22, 186?, p. 3.
20L, M. Kennett to Hauser, June 6, 186?, Hauser Papers. The 
Rocky Mountain Gazette, July 6, 186?, p, 1. The Montana Post, August 
10, 1867, p. 1.
21Samuel Gaty and John How to Hauser, June 11 and August 12, 
1867, Hauser Papers,
—10“
The James Stuart mill was completed October 3> 1B6? at a cost 
of about $75,000. After a short run to adjust machinery, full opera­
tions began October lU. The mill had a custom-built U5 horsepower 
steam engine, ten ore stamps, six amalgamating pans, and three concen­
trators. The opening was a gala event for Philipsburg and was 
accompanied by a celebration which included speeches, toasts, a band 
and dancing,
Operations began as a complete success, and James Stuart 
notified treasurer How that 259 pounds of bullion were recovered from 
35 tons of ore at a cost of $25 per ton for processing. One month 
later the milling of 250 tons of ore had _yxexded 790 pounds of bullion. 
Encouraged by these results, James Stuart put two shifts of miners on 
the Hope lode to dig a six-foot square hole designed to reveal the 
extent of the ore body.^^
Work on the Hope lode continued during the following winter. 
Philipsburg now had a population of 600, and the Herald called the 
mill at the end of Main Street "an ornament in its architectural 
finish" and "a model of workmanship."^^ ^n September, 1867, 1,6UU
shares of special preferred stock were issued with prospects apparently 
good enough for Hauser to invest an additional $16,100 (U60 shares) 
for himself "and associates. Exhaustion of the ore body caused the
22The Montana Post, October 26, 1867, p. 5. See also Appendix
B, p. 79 •
23W. H. Keys to James Stuart and Hauser, October 15 and Novem­
ber 21, 1867, Hauser Papers.
^^The Helena Herald (Helena, Montana), January 2, I868, p, 7. 
^Receipt of How to Hauser, February 11, 1%6S, Hauser Papers.
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mill to stop early in 1868, but the company had succeeded in 
recovering 58.5 per cent of the silver content in the ore compared 
with only UO per cent when operation first began.
With the mill closed, exploration and development work con­
tinued on the Hope lode during the summer of 1868. The ore recovered 
was not sufficient to keep the mill in steady operation, however, and 
by August the mill was doing custom work on ores from the Rumley and 
Burgher lodes. Two months later the mill was operating on second 
class ore from the Poor Man's Joy with better quality ore shipped to 
New York or Europe for processing.
Custom milling did not pay expenses, however, and James Stuart
was disappointed in silver mining. By October, 1868, he was ready to
get out of the company because, as he wrote Hauser, quartz mining was
"humbug" and would pay only once in a thousand times. He estimated
that $100,000 were required to pay debts, prospect, and wait for a
paying lode to be discovered. The company owed more than $^0,000 by
27this time and prospects for improvement were dim. Dance agreed.
The company was indeed in financial difficulty, and in October, 
1868 supplies at Montana City were attached for debts. In addition, 
the company owed $2,000 in taxes to three co\anties— Beaverhead, Madi­
son, and Deer Lodge, The company agent at Montana City had been trying 
to sell the equipment for a year with no success, Stuart said that 
only a mortgage held by Dance, Stuart and Company prevented a number
2^The Helena Herald, March 26, 1868, p. 1.
27james Stuart to Hauser, October l6, 1̂ 68, Hauser Papers,
= 12=
of law suits. Apparently the mortgage of Dance, Stuart and Company 
covered most of the property at Argenta, thus giving them first right
pQto collection of debts.
One month later the mill at Philipsburg was closed with all
except five miners discharged. Because custom milling of Rumley and
Burgher ores on a percentage basis was not profitable, James Stuart
offered to mill the ore for $2^ per ton in currency. The offer was
refused. Although there was enough ore available to pay expenses,
litigation concerning the ownership of claims persuaded James Stuart
29to close the mill.
Silver production in Montana during 1868 yielded about 
$100,000, while $1^,000,000 were received from the sale of other 
minerals, principally gold. R. W. Raymond, United States commissioner 
of mining statistics, thought Montana needed a separation of mine and 
furnace ownership, a market for lead, cheaper labor, and coal suscep- - 
tible of being coked. The mineral law passed by Congress in 1866 also 
presented a problem. 0. B. O'Bannan, United States land office regis­
trar in Helena, said that of thirty-six applications for patents in 
Montana under the law, seven were contested, six withdrawn, and nine patents 
actually issued. Because proceedings for obtaining a patent were so 
tedious and expensive, most claim owners thought it better to depend
?RJames Stuart to Hauser, October 31, 1868, Stuart Letterbook 
A, (Montana State University Library, Missoula, Montana). Hereafter 
cited as Stuart Letterbook A or B.
29James Stuart to Hauser, November 12, 1868, ibid.
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on claim rights alone rather than apply for a patent and risk a 
lawsuit.
The law in most mining districts during this period was a 
c\irious, complicated amalgamation of British, French, and Spanish 
mining laws and customs. With the discovery of gold in California 
in I8U9 , Americans faced the problom of national mining laws for the 
first time. Several statutes relating to mining had been passed by 
the federal government, but most pertained only to specific cases or 
minerals. Because no uniform body of statutes or common law for 
mining existed, the California miners organized districts, drew on 
their imperfect knowledge and impressions of what mineral law should 
be, and decided upon the laws of the district. In spite of a rather 
feeble attempt in 1866 to standardize mining law, a determination of 
the law applying to any particular mining district prior to 18?2 de­
pended upon crude--yet somehow workable— laws written by the miners. 
The federal act of 1872 did set forth a national mining law, and this 
act remains the major mineral statute to this day.
In the annual report for I868 the St. Louis and Montana Mining 
Company said that 1^,560 shares of common stock at par value of $100 
each had been issued in addition to 1,6UU shares of preferred stock 
issued in September 186? at $35 per share. The latter were redeemable 
in December, I868 at $80 per share. In view of the generous apprecia­
tion of value promised on the preferred stock, it is assumed that this
R. W. Raymond, The Mines of the West (New York; J, B, Ford 
& Co., 1869), pp. 150-55. For definitions of mining terms, see 
Appendix D, p. 88.
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issue was intended only for sale to common stockholders, although no 
indication of intent is discernible from the data. The company had 
raised a total of $287,000 from stock sales— $6 0 ,0 0 0 of which came 
from tiie sale of preferred stock— in addition to $65,000 received from 
the sale of bullion. Of total funds raised, $130,000 were lost on 
operations at Montana City and the property there was worth only 
$5,000. Company holdings at Philipsburg were valued at some $lli7,000, 
but debts against these holdings amounted to $73,000.
The board of directors decided to sell $100,000 in bonds bearing 
ten per cent interest and payable in eighteen months.The bonds, 
which were later purchased chiefly by stockholders, were sold at eighty 
cents on the dollar as a further inducement. In view of the company’s 
earlier financial difficulties, the discount was probably necessary. 
Indeed, the choice of bonds itself is perhaps indicative of the 
measures necessary to raise more money. Why bonds? Presumably these 
men were astute enough to realize that prices were falling during this 
period and the bonds would be paid in dollars worth more at the time 
of redemption than at the time of sale. Bonds sold only to stockholders 
with generous interest plus an appreciated dollar value, would reward 
the men willing to dig a bit deeper for the common interest. The 
$80,000 raised from this sale of bonds was considered sufficient to 
cover indebtedness of the company and provide operating funds for six
31During this period, bond sales were a common device used to 
raise more money and sometimes to "freeze out" minority stockholders. 
There is no evidence to indicate that this particular sale was intend­
ed to "freeze out" small stockholders. The generous interest rate 
was probably necessary because of the risks involved in a mining 
venture which had failed once.
months. Other recommendations, all of which were accepted, included
reducing all expenses not absolutely necessary, leaving the mill idle
until a stockpile of ore was accumulated, leasing the Montana City
works, and appointing an assistant secretary for Montana to report
32directly to the board.
L. C. Garnier replaced Gaty as president, and operations were 
resumed in Montana with six men employed mining ore. James Stuart 
continued as superintendent in Montana. Although some ore was recover­
ed, the results did not warrant starting the mill, and he suggested
that the mill remain closed until April vÈien shipments could be made
33via the Missouri River.
In March, 1869, all work at Philipsburg was suspended. The 
company had ordered James Stuart not to operate at a loss and by May, 
only he and one other man were employed. There were enough supplies 
on hand for nearly a year, but the lure of placer mining had raised 
wages to $U or $$ per day. Stuart suggested that the mill be closed 
until winter when miners could be obtained for $50 to $60 a month.
With the mill and mine closed, Philipsburg was almost deserted.
The mill remained closed during the summer of 1869, and in 
August the directors considered leasing it to William Purvine. The
32Report to the Stockholders of the St. Louis and Montana 
Mining Company Submitted at Their Adjourned Meeting Held January 2, 
1869 (St. Louis : Dispatch Book and Job Office, 1869TÎ '
33
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James Stuart to L. 0. Garnier, January 27, February 6, 1869, 
Stuart tterbook A.
James Stuart to Charles Taussig, May 30, 1869, ibid.
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lessee was to take all supplies, wood and material on hand at current 
market value in Montana. New machinery could be installed, but the 
company reserved the right to purchase the machinery later at its 
actual cost. In September, Purvine leased the mill for a reported 
sum of $20,000 a year.
Meanwhile the company's property at Montana City had been 
seized for debts, and a representative was sent to that place to pay 
the debts and lease the works with the stipulation that ore owned by 
the company would be processed. Active operations by the St. Louis 
and Montana Mining Company at Montana City ceased.
Mineral production in Montana declined during 1869. Raymond 
observed that no fixed process for milling ore at the James Stuart mill 
had been developed, with the amount of salt and type of chemicals con­
stantly being varied in an attempt to discover the best method of 
recovering silver. The mill was idle awaiting repairs.^? Certainly 
the company had made no profit during the year.
Nor was Purvine making a profit doing custom milling, and James
38Stuart thought the company would certainly fail early in IS7 0. The 
mill ran intermittently during the year, and when Purvine's lease
^^Charles Taussig to Hauser, August 11 and September 21, I869, 
Hauser Papers. The Helena Herald, October 7j I869, p. 8.
^̂ S. W. Barber to Hauser, October lU, I869, Hauser Papers. 
James Stuart to F. Kennett, November 5j 1869, Stuart Letterbook A.
37R. W. Raymond, Statistics of Mines and Mining (Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 187O), pp. 7, 2̂ U, 276.
n O
James Stuart to Hauser, March 5, 1970, Stuart Letterbook A.
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expired, the company replaced James Stuart with a "Captain" George 
Plaisted, formerly of the Cable mine. The mill was started on Hope 
lode ore and the company attempted to procure custom work at $2^ per
ton.39
Early in I87I the mill was closed once more, Plaisted and a 
man named Waterbury sought to lease the property, but the offer was 
probably turned down.^® All activity ceased. Although a small profit 
may have been made by leasing the mill during I87O, a loss was- no 
doubt incurred during I871.
Early in 1872 the mill process was changed as far as practi­
cable to dry crushing, with furnaces and a drying kiln constructed by 
lessees. Ores processed during the year were principally from the 
Spreckled Trout mine— not owned by the company-— with small quantities 
yielding $125 to $190 per ton shipped to Reno, Nevada.The Helena 
Herald said about 150 men were employed in Philipsburg during the 
year, indicating that overall mining activity was comparable to 1867- 
Although costs of working ore were said to have been twice what they 
should be— the reasons were not stated— the operation was described 
as profitable,Montana’s mineral production dropped sharply in
89The Rocky Mountain Daily Gazette (Helena, Montana), March I6 , 
1870, p, 2, The Helena Herald (Helgia, Montana), December ^, I870, 
p, 3.
^^Dance to Hauser, February 2U, F, Kennett to Hauser, May 1, 
and J. H, Brown to Hauser, August 31, I87I, Hauser Papers,
^^R. W. Raymond, Statistics of Mines and Mining in the States and 
Terri tories West _of the Rocky Mount ains (Washington; Government Print­
ing Office, 1873), p. 3.
^^The Helena Herald, August 1, 1872, p, 6,
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1872, perhaps this drop indicated that the territory was in a trans­
itional stage between simple placer mining for gold and the more 
sophisticated mining methods that followed.
During the year, Felix MeArdie came to Montana to inspect the 
work done. He reported that ore taken from the Comanche lode was too 
poor to show a profit, and although $25,000 had been expended on the 
Hope lode, the work was haphazard at best, resulting in no improvement. 
The company had achieved a gross profit of $11)4 ,000 from crushing 952 
tons of ore in 170 days of operation by the mill. After expenses of 
about $6U,000 were paid, a net profit of some $50 ,000 remained.
McArdle concluded that an expansion of the mill to handle more ore was 
the remedy needed. He estimated the ore at $25 per ton assay value, 
but because the present mill could extract only seventy per cent, 
expenses for milling were three dollars more than the recovery value 
of about $17 .50 in silver bullion per ton of ore. In order to reduce 
milling costs, McArdle recommended a $16,000 expansion of the mill.
He also urged the procurement of suitable equipment for prospecting, 
the mining of at least a thousand tons of ore before the mill was 
started, the shipment of Montana City ores to Philipsburg for pro­
cessing, and erecting a mill at Montana City if necessary. Total cost 
was estimated at $201,000.
McArdle said it was impossible to pay holders of the first 
mortgage bonds. To refinance the venture, he suggested the creation 
of a new corporation called the Hope Mining Company with capital 
stock of $U00,000 divided into 8,000 shares with par value of $50,
For each $50 in cash received, $100 in stock should be issued. The
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holders of the first mortgage bonds would receive two dollars of
stock in the new company for each one dollar in bonds held, plus
) ̂interest to September, 1872.
The company decided to reorganize. A meeting of the first 
mortgage bond holders determined that it was impossible to pay the 
bonds which were due. To purchase the property of the St. Louis and
UhMontana Mining Company, the bondholders organized a new corporation.
The creditors then foreclosed and sold the company property. In 
January, 1873, a notice of public sale of the entire holdings appeared 
in the Rocky Mountain Daily Gazette. The company had failed.
Reasons for the failure are not hard to find. Silver mining 
was a new industry in the United States; the first great strikes were 
made in Nevada in 18 9̂. Processing methods were poor, as indicated by 
the UO per cent recovery rate when the James Stuart mill first opened. 
Silver occurred in a variety of formations, each one requiring a pre­
cise processing, and the failure of the St. Louis and Montana Mining 
Company was partially due to crude processing techniques.
A second reason for failure was the lack of knowledge concern­
ing the lodes or veins worked. The company applied no technique except
Report to the Holders of the First Mortgage Bonds of the St. 
Louis and Montana Mining Company (St. Louis: St. Louis Dispatch
Print, 1872).
^^Gaty to the Bondholders, in Hope Mining Company Papers 
(Montana State Historical Society Library, Helena, Montana). Cited 
hereafter as Hope Papers.
^^The Rocky Mountain Daily Gazette (Helena, Montana), January 21, 
1873, p. 2.
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digging to explore ore bodies, and as a result a great deal of money
was spent locating new ore which even then could not be systematically
exploited because the extent of the strike was unknown.
The geographical location also made mining in Montana a high 
cost operation. Transport of supplies and ore cost $20 per ton by 
wagon to Ft. Benton, $20 from Ft. Benton to St. Louis by steamboat, 
and $10 to $1^ from St. Louis to the seaboard. Overseas shipment of 
ore for processing cost an additional $15 per ton.^^ Total transport
of ore, if shipped to foreign processing plants, cost $65 to $70 per
ton— more than most ore mined by the company was worth. New machinery 
freighted from the railhead at Corrine, Utah, cost $35 per ton, with 
quicksilver from California, and salt from Idaho subject to equally 
high rates.
Add to these costs the high wages of laborers lured to pros­
pecting and placer mining each summer, the optimum period for mining 
and milling, delays in receiving needed supplies and repairs, difficult 
communication with the home office, inexperienced management, poor 
processing techniques, and one does not wonder that the company failed. 
The wonder is rather that the investors wanted to reorganize a new 
company to continue mining after 1^72.
The question naturally arises— was this company beneficial or 
detrimental to Montana? The answer is, beneficial with some qualifica­
tions. Although a large amount of money was spent at Montana City,
The Helena Herald, November 1, 1871, p. 2. R. W. Raymond, 
Mines of the West, pp. llil, l52. The Rocky Mountain Daily Gazette, 
June HIT 1^70, p. 2.
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the territory received little or no lasting benefit from the operation. 
Conversely, the Philipsburg operation created a new population center 
in the territory and provided at least a rudimentary economic basis 
for agriculture, trade and transportation. In a period characterized 
by wild rushes from gold field to gold field, Philipsburg probably 
exerted some measure of stabilization on the territory. A good deal 
of skill was also introduced into the territory by men such as Deide- 
sheimer, Steitz and Swallow. And, finally, the company employed at 
least a small labor force for seven years. As yet, very little mineral 
wealth had been extracted from the territory. On the debit side, it 
was not to be denied that silver ore had been extracted, and the early 
loss of control by Montana investors was not a jzood omen. Still, at 
least to this time, Montana probably was a benefactor.
CHAPTER II 
A NEW CCMPANT BEGINS, 1872-80
In November, 1^72, the Missouri Petroleum and Mining Company, 
by authority granted in its corporate charter, created 8,000 shares 
of special stock worth $U00,000, This stock was disposed of and the 
buyers became a separate corporation, known as the Hope Mining Com­
pany. Felix McArdle, president of the Missouri Petroleum and Mining 
Company, became secretary of the new organization, while Charles 
Whittelsey exchanged the job of secretary in the parent organization 
for that of president in the new company,^
With one failure behind them, the St. Louis capitalists de­
cided to retain firm control of the Hope Company. Not one of the 
Montana men associated with the St. Louis and Montana Mining Company 
appeared on the list of thirteen directors. While the men who 
originally supplied the impetus for the venture and exercised some 
control retained an interest, St. Louis dominated the company com­
pletely from this time forward.
Felix McArdle, who had earlier inspected the company and 
recommended the reorganization, returned to Montana to take personal 
charge of the enterprise. Until the middle of I87U, the company was 
concerned chiefly with putting its business affairs in order. To save
^Montana, Secretary of State. Copy Book A, p. 1̂ 1.
- 2 2 -
-23-
money on patenting expenses, an agreement was reached between the
corporation and Montana claim owners whereby the company patented
claims to eight lodes. Thus one patent and one fee covered each claim.
After the claims were patented, portions of the Wabus, Horton, Robert
Burns and W. B. Dance lodes were deeded back to Dance while undivided
interests in the Hope, Cliff, Lady Byron, and Comanche lodes were
deeded jointly to W. B. Dance, S. T. Hauser, Granville Stuart, Thomas
Stuart and Rezin Anderson, Granville and Thomas Stuart had become
heirs to the interest James Stuart had owned following his death at
2Ft. Peck, Montana in 1B?3.
With this accomplished, the company prepared to begin opera­
tions. B. P- Tilden became superintendent upon the death of McArdle in 
the summer of 18?U, and activity was renewed in August after a long 
period of idleness. A year after the panic of 1873, the managers 
probably hoped for an early recovery. The enterprise started slowly, 
and after an erratic summer operation which was probably not very 
profitable, activity was stepped up slightly in October.^
Information concerning the company in 1%?$ is scanty, but in 
April Tilden said the mines looked excellent, and work increased in 
June. With typical forced hopefulness, the New Northwest proclaimed 
that Tilden was "prosecuting work as directed by the company with every 
indication that it will continue to abundant success...."^
2Granville Stuart to Felix McArdle, December 19, 1873, Stuart 
Letterbook A.
^The New Northwest (Deer Lodge, Montana), August 27, August 22, 
October 2U, October 31, 187U, pp. 3, 3, 3, 3.
^Ibid., June 11, August 27, 1875, pp. 3, 3.
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During the latter months of 18?5 and January IB76, some 
improvements were made at the mill while work continued at the mine. 
Although Tilden reported that the mine and mill were again operating 
smoothly, 18?6 was a mediocre year at best. The company shipped only 
$30 ,00 0 in bullion during the year, according to newspaper reports.
These shipments indicated operations were marginal with little or no 
profit gained.^
By early 1877, Granville Stuart, hard pressed for funds, com­
plained to Hauser that the company was delaying the patenting of 
property in order to steal the claims of Montana owners, and stressed 
that no dividends had been paid.^ The accusations were probably unjust. 
Certainly the company was in no position to pay dividends, because in 
April, Ringeling brought $9,000 in bullion to Philipsburg, converted 
it to cash, and returned to pay the employees, A telegram had been 
received instructing him to "stop all work in mines and mill; dis- 
charge and pay off the men." The accusation concerning property is 
not substantiated by any other evidence; Stuart was guessing. A lack 
of sufficient ore probably occasioned the closure, but by September 
the mill was running again on low grade ore while exploration at the 
mines continued. This exploration evidently was rewarded, and during 
the last three months of 1877 silver bullion worth $56,000 was shipped.
^Ibid., January 7, April lU, August 11, September P, December 8, 
1876, pp, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3.
^Telegram of G, Stuart to Hauser, March 3O, 1877, Stuart 
Letterbook A,
7The New Northwest, April 13, 1877, p, 3.
— 25”
according to the New Northwest. This amount, plus $10,000 in bullion 
reportedly shipped earlier, would indicate a gross income of some 
$66,000 for the year. The newspapers, especially those of small towns, 
were sometimes overly optimistic, however, and it seems likely that 
the amount grossed was somewhat less than the total reported in the 
New Northwest. The company probably made little or no profit overall. 
David Carson, who became superintendent during the year, may have 
been partially responsible for the rather good showing for the last
g
quarter of the year.
The deposit was worked out by early 1878, and in June the mill 
was idle once more. Although the New Northwest proclaimed that a rich 
body of ore had been found, a constant cry in the western mining camps, 
the mill was not started until December and even then the operations 
consisted of reworking tailings. In an attempt to determine if any 
profits could be made by reworking mill wastes, the company used van- 
ners. A vanner was essentially a wide rubber belt running over pulleys 
with a side shake. A stream of water, flowing down the belt, washed 
light minerals away from heavier ones, in effect mechanized placer 
mining. Bullion valued at $27,000 was shipped in 1878, less than half 
the amount shipped the year before. If the New Northwest was not 
overly optimistic in calculating the value of ore milled during the 
year, the mill processed only about UOO tons.^ It would be difficult
g
Ibid., September 7j October 19, November l6 , December 21, 
January 19, 1877, pp. 3, 3, 3, 3, 3.
9Ibid., June 7, December 13, February 22, I878, pp. 3, 3, 3. 
Total bullion shipped of $27,000 divided by $70 per ton value indi­
cates 3 8 5 .7 tons milled. This figure was rounded to UOO tons.
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to show even a modest profit from this scale of operations, and 
although no definite conclusions can be drawn from these incomplete 
data, it is possible that the company again lost money. But the 
Bland-Allison Act was passed in I878, and at the year’s end the out­
look for silver had improved. In addition to increasing the demand 
for silver, this act made silver certificates, backed by a set amount 
of the white metal, equal in value to gold certificates even though 
the latter metal was more valuable.
The following year was not profitable even though the outlook 
for silver had improved. During the early months of 1879 the vanners 
continued to work while extensive prospecting was carried on at the 
mine. The reworking of tailings was unprofitable, however, and 
superintendent Clark decided the tailings should be reprocessed by 
the mill instead. A contemplated change from wet to dry crushing 
was apparently discarded with the discovery of a new deposit late in 
the year- This new ore from the Cliff claim, together with normal 
wear on machinery, was probably responsible for improvements in the 
form of new settlers and pans installed in October. Even though the 
mill ran on tailings for several months and an ore strike on the Cliff 
claim was reported, no shipments of bullion were reported, the lack of 
shipments suggesting that the company incurred a loss for the year’s 
operation. Positive gains were made in the form of better knowledge 
of the ore bodies, improvements in the mill, and a better knowledge 
of milling techniques.
^^Ibid., April U, May 9, June 6, October 2U, 1879, pp. h, 3,
3, 3.
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Some perspective regarding the financial condition of the 
company at this time may be gained from the letters of Granville 
Stuart. Early in 1879, he said that although he had offered to sell 
his stock at UO per cent of face value, no one -would purchase it. Late 
that same year, however, he wanted to buy stock belonging to the W. B. 
Dance estate at 30 per cent, and finally bought the stock at about 37 
per cent of face value.Stock in the Hope Company was apparently 
worth nearly UO per cent of its face value in spite of five years' 
operations which are best characterized as marginal. This is rather 
remarkable, considering the violent fluctuations in many mining stocks, 
and is perhaps something of a testimonial to the stability associated 
with the St. Louis investors. In addition, the company possessed a 
very good mill, several promising claims, and a demonstrated ability 
to sustain operations over a period of some thirteen years, a consider­
able achievement compared with the short lives of many mining companies 
of the peri od.
The following year is almost lost in obscurity. Only one mention
of the company was made by the New Northwest, in February of 1880, and
12this was a report that the mill was running steadily on Hope ore.
The Montana owners tried to sell their interest in the Hope claim lode,
13but apparently failed. At the time, partial interest in the Hope
Stuart to George W. Irvin, between January 27 and March 10, 
and October 10, 1879, Stuart Letterbook A.
12The New Northwest, February 13, 1880, p. 3.
^̂ G. Stuart to Anderson and T. Stuart, February 19, 18^0,
Stuart Letterbook. Copy. (Microfilm copy in Montana State Historical 
Society Library, Helena, Montana). Cited hereafter as Stuart Microfilm.
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claim was owned jointly by Hauser, Granville Stuart, Thomas Stuart, 
and Rezin Anderson. It is not possible to judge whether the company 
made a profit or incurred a loss in i860, and at the end of the year, 
only two mines were operating at Philipsburg— the Algonquin and Hope.
Philipsburg's population had increased from 9̂ to 299 during 
the period 18?0 to I88O, and the Hope Company was the only mining 
venture in the area which has spanned the decade and was still in 
active operation.After the reorganization in 18?2, the company 
spent most of the time up to 1880 attempting to unearth a body of ore 
that would provide a steady supply for the mill, and following two 
years of marginal operations, the ore ran out in 1877- A new supply 
was found later that year, but by I878 this deposit was also depleted. 
While exploration went on, the company attempted to recover silver 
from the tailings by working them with vanners, but the operation was 
not profitable and had to be abandoned. Ore uncovered in the Cliff 
lode during 1879 probably was exhausted during that or the following 
year. The period was only moderately successful for the Hope Company, 
with the years 1875 to 1877 the best of a rather poor lot.
In 1877 the company was made aware of the fact that bullion 
actually on the property at the time of the territorial property 
assessment was taxable as real property. The Montana superintendent 
was apparently ignorant of this application of the revenue act of 1^72 
when he advised Gaty that the sheriff and county assessor had appeared
^Albert Blumenthal, Small Town Stuff (Chicago; University of 
Chicago Press, 1932), p. 23.
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to seize the property for sale to pay "what they call taxes on 
bullion.Swiftly the property was impounded on March 21, 1^77 and 
advertised for sale on March 28.^^ The case was contested, albeit 
weakly, by the company, and the court held that bullion was taxable as 
property under the revenue act of 1872. Thus the principle was estab­
lished that in addition to a one per cent tax on bullion passed in 
1866, mininp companies were subject to property tax on the bullion 
held at the time of the territorial tax assessment.
^^O’Bannon to Gaty, March 21, 1877, Hauser Papers.
^%bid.
'̂̂ Hope Mining Co., v. Kennon, 3 Montana 35 (l880).
CHAPTER III 
THE THRESHOLD OF SUCCESS, 18^1-83
Operations appear to have been quite successful during 1881,
with both mine and mill working steadily for most of the year although
only one shipment of ore was recorded in the New Northwest ($20,000 in
April).^ One source claimed that during l88l a rich body of ore was
2discovered which yielded about $360,000. If the report is true, 18%1 
may have been the best year up to this time.
The body of ore discovered at the Cliff lode was exhausted by 
mid=l88l and exploratory work was once more under way in September,
In October the mill closed for repairs but soon reopened. A major 
development of the year was the beginning of the Jubilee tunnel, which 
became the major means of exploiting the mine.^ In addition to yield­
ing information regarding the ore body, this tunnel eliminated the need 
to work through a shaft, with attendant savings in time and hoisting 
equipment. Hauser, acting for the Montana owners, concluded a three- 
year agreement with the company under which the portions of certain
^The New Northwest, April 29, l88l, p. 3.
2W. H. Emmons and F. C. Calkins, Geology and Ore Deposits of 
the Philipsburg Quadrangle Montana, U. S. Geological Survey Profes­
sional Paper No. 78 (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office,
1913), p. 213.
^The New Northwest, September 9, October 7, October 28, 
November 2̂ , 1881, pp. 3, 3, 3, 3«
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lodes not owned by the corporation would be worked, seventeen dollars 
per ton deducted to cover costs, and the remaining profits divided 
between the Hope Company and the Montana joint owners.^ Later, this 
agreement caused a great deal of trouble for both contracting parties. 
While information is very scarce, it is possible that a profit was 
made during I88I.
In 1882 the Granite Mountain Mining Company was organized by 
St. Louis interests.^ Because no list of the stockholders is avail­
able, the precise relationship between this organization and the Hope 
Company is not clear, but some degree of association-effected through 
an interlocking directorate and Frank L, Perkins, a superintendent of 
the Hope Company— did exist.
An indication of the relationship is revealed in a letter from 
Perkins to the First National Bank of Helena with instructions concern­
ing the handling of "our accounts," meaning the accounts of the Hope 
and Granite Mountain companies, Perkins also told the bank that when 
signing checks for the Hope Company he signed as superintendent, while 
he signed Granite Mountain Mining Company checks as "in charge."^ The 
bank was apparently having some difficulty in keeping the accounts 
separate. It is also interesting to note that the Granite Mountain 
Mining Company paid Perkins’ salary during July, August, October, 
November, and December of 1882, while he was conduting business for
^Hauser to Gaty, July 1, I88I, Hauser Papers.
^Montana, Secretary of State. Copy Book H, p. 729.
F̂. L. Perkins to E. W, Knight, July lU and July 3, 18̂ 2, 
Hope Papers.
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7the Hope Company during the same period.
The Hope Company probably had one of its more successful years 
in 1882. The New Northwest said in April that the mill had been run­
ning steadily since the beginning of the year, and further expansion
Qincreased the number of stamps to twenty at the mill. Montana 
expenses were $7,200, $9,600, $7,900, and $10,000 for January,
March, April, and August, respectively— a scale of operations that 
would probably not have been maintained unless profitable.^
The Montana joint owners of land leased to the Company became 
concerned about non-receipt of royalty payments during the year, and 
they engaged Charles Clark--former superintendent of the Hope Company— 
to approach the corporation about this matter.Apparently because 
the Company still did not act, George W. Irvin proposed to Hauser thaf 
they litigate their claims, saying that a jury in Deer Lodge would be 
disposed to favor them over the Hope Company,Although the case 
could possibly have been carried to the United States Supreme Court on 
a plea of diverse citizenship of the parties, mining companies of the
^Statement of Cash Account, July 21 and August 23, 1882, in 
Granite Mountain Mining Company Papers (Montana State Historical Society 
Library, Helena, Montana), Cited hereafter as Granite Papers. Perkins 
to Knight, August 2, October 25, November 22, December 26, 1882, Hope 
Papers.
^The New Northwest, April lii, 1882, p. 2.
^Perkins to Gaty, January (?), March 10, April 12, August 2, 
1882, Hope Papers.
^^Perkins to Gaty, June 18, 1882, ibid.
^^Irvin to Hauser, July 12, 1882, Hauser Papers.
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period incurred enough expensive litigation without seeking disputes, 
and the Company belatedly issued a statement to the Montana joint 
owners showing that 290 tons of ore with an assay value of 7,330 ounces 
of silver had been mined from the leased portion of the Hope lode
1 pduring November through December, 1881, and January, 1882. The 
statement was issued in August, 1882, even though Gaty had written 
Hauser a month earlier that no good ore had been f o u n d , W h i l e  
Gaty may not have known how much ore had been mined when he penned the 
letter, it appears quite unlikely that the information was unavailable 
in St. Louis, Payment of the royalties was even later in coming. Not 
until January, 1886, did the joint owners receive $2,600 for mining 
operations conducted from l88l to I883, and the payment was extracted 
from the company only after a good deal of bickering.^
By early I883 the ore "played out" once more, and, with the 
mill under repair, an old mine was explored for paying deposits. In 
May a systematic search for ore began with a diamond drill— the first 
such machine used in Montana, With the new device, test holes were 
drilled in a systematic pattern to determine the location, extent, and 
depth of ore bodies. This was a great improvement over the previous 
method of digging tunnels and shafts by hand with no real knowledge of 
the geological formations. The drill also permitted systematic ex­
ploitation of a strike after the ore was discovered. In June the mill
12Statement of Ore Extracted and Milled from Ground Leased from
Messrs. Hauser, et ai, August 1, 1882, Hope Papers.
^^Gaty to Hauser, July 25, 1882, Hauser Papers, 
^Receipt, January, 1886, ibid.
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was operating again with diamond drill exploration continuing.
The opening of the Northern Pacific Railroad— at Drummond, some 
26 miles north of Philipsburg-“Was a major event of 18%3. Some appre­
ciation of the impact the railway had on transportation costs is shown 
in the reduction of the price of salt (used in the chloridation process 
at the mill) from $55 to $25 a ton delivered at Drummond. Although 
transportation costs remained a problem, the opening of the railroad 
to Drummond greatly improved access to the mines.
While the company's profits may not have been large during 1”83, 
the introduction of an efficient and systematic method of exploration 
was a large step forward and allowed the company to begin a period of 
greater prosperity. The "free silver" boom had begun and prospects 
for silver mining were considerably improved. After the passage of 
the Bland-Allison act, it appeared that legislation favorable to silver 
would continue to help hold up prices through large government pur­
chases. As long as the government was willing to purchase a set 
number of ounces of silver at a fixed price, silver prices could hardl;y 
decline. And with a number of territories, all in the West, to be 
admitted to the Union, the strength of the silver advocates would 
probably increase.
^The New Northwest, May 25> July 13, 1883, pp. 3, 2. For a 
description of a diamond drill, see Robert J. Lewis, Elements of 
Mining (2d ed; New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., I9EI), pp. 125-31-
CHAPTER IV 
SUCCESSFUL YEARS, 188U-9U
The period l88U through l89U was perhaps the most prosperous 
of the entire life of the Hope Company. With the use of the diamond 
drill for exploration, the supply of ore became less of a problem than 
it had been. The two years of largest production were 1892 and 1893? 
and although silver prices declined after I89O, the company showed a 
handsome profit. The panic of 1893, the repeal of the Sherman Silver 
Purchase Act, and the effects of greatly increased world production of 
silver contributed to a sharp drop in sil-ver prices. The company res­
ponded by curtailing mining in I89U, and from that time forward activity 
gradually decreased until all operations were finally abandoned at 
Philipsburg.
The large sum of money spent on development in 1%91— possibly 
in a frantic search for ore after the Sherman Act of I89O— led to the 
two most prosperous years, 1892 and 1893. In its best year (1892) the 
company produced over U00,000 ounces of silver, grossed $381,000, paid 
$5 0 ,0 0 0 in dividends, and established a reserve fund of $100,000. The 
period I88I4 through I888 was also successful, with the company probably 
averaging about $50,000 per year in dividends. The worst year was 
1890, when the company lost $2U,0 0 0, but the era was one of prosperity 
for silver mining and for Philips burg. Philipsburg's population grew 
from 299 in I88O to 1,058 in I89O and Granite, a sister town, had an
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even larger population— 1,310 in 1890.^ During 18R1| to 189^, the 
Philipsburg area was known as one of the largest silver producing 
areas in the world, a title it lost in 189U and never regained.
The Hope mill (formerly James Stuart mill) operated for a total 
of 188 days in 188U crushing about U,900 tons of ore at a cost of 
about nine dollars per ton. This cost of milling is quite high com­
pared with later years— probably because of the low content of 
silver and the complex nature of the ore-— but much lower than the 
$25 a ton cost in the i860’s. Siller commanded a good price, however, 
and the company disbursed more than $56,000 in dividends during the 
year. The ore found in the Hope, Comanche, and Emma mines was ex­
hausted and further exploration failed to uncover new ore except on
the Potosi claim. As a result, the company again passed tailings
2through the mill when it would otherwise have been idle, Frank L. 
Perkins resigned as superintendent of the Hope Company to become 
superintendent of the Granite Mountain Mining Company, his employer 
since July, l88U, and was replaced by George H. Babcock.^
In 1885, the mill pounded away for 295 days crushing about 8,200 
tons of ore which Babcock described as poorer than ever. This poor 
quality resulted in a large amount of ore being milled at high cost 
and may have induced the company to install a new boiler at the mill 
which saved twenty cords of wood per week. A deposit discovered by
^Blumenthal, on,cit.. p. 23.
2The New Northwest, March 21, 188U, p. 3»
^Perkins to Hope Company, November 28, 1^8h, Granite Papers.
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the diamond drill looked promising enough to begin sinking a shaft 
225 feet deep, the deepest on Hope Hill.^
A number of monthly "estimates of funds" appeared during 18#5«
It seems that most business functions of the company were performed in 
St. Louis, with receipts from bullion sales deposited in the Hope Com­
pany account in a St. Louis bank. The Montana office submitted a 
monthly estimate of funds required for mining and milling operations. 
After the St. Louis office had transferred the money to the First 
National Bank of Helena in Montana--a bank owned by Hauser— the Montana 
office at Philipsburg drew on the Helena bank for operating funds. 
Montana expenses for the year varied from $8,000 to $9,600 per month, 
averaging about $8,700.^ At $8,700 a month, these data indicate about 
$10^,000 as Montana expenses for the year. All expenses were not in­
cluded in this estimate, however. To this figure was probably added 
the cost of supplies purchased in St. Louis for mining operations, 
raising the total of local expenses to $117,000, as shown in the annual 
report. A second explanation for the discrepancy between the estimated 
and reported total is that the fiscal year did not coincide with the 
calendar year.
Operations for 1885 were probably not very successful, and by 
early November the mill stood idle with the labor force cut to six men. 
It is not surprising that during poorer periods the Company reduced
^Babcock to Hope Company, undated (October, 18^5?), Hope Papers,
^Estimates for Funds, January, February, March, May, June, July. 
August, October, November, December, 1885, Hope Papers.
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the labor force as a first step toward economy. During 1885, wages 
constituted about 68 per cent of total Montana costs. Haulage of 
quartz and wood to the mill made up sixteen per cent, and supplies 
accounted for about eight per cent of Montana expenses. With a reduced 
labor force, the Company began to sink the Potosi Shaft No. 2 in Decem­
ber searching for ore.^
Ore, which the New Northwest proclaimed was "of excellent 
quality and abundant quantity," was struck in the Potosi Shaft No. 2 
in January, 1886, but the newspaper's sanguine statement was not borne 
out.7 In the same month that ore was discovered, the mill closed down
Oonce more. With the ore body worked out, levels were driven out from 
the shaft in the following months and enough new ore was uncovered to 
keep the mill in almost steady operation for the rest of the year. Ore 
quality was poor, however, averaging only 17.3 ounces per ton recovered 
at the mill and expenses were high— $10,000 for the new shaft and hoist 
and $56,000 for running levels and drifts. From this activity, the 
Company lost about $17,000 for the year. Estimated expenses were 
$130 ,000 balanced against $llU,000 received from bullion sales.^
Possibly because of the poor year preceding, W. W. Adams was 
appointed to succeed Babcock as Montana superintendent in 1887- Ore 
in the Potosi No. 2 shaft dwindled and attention turned toward the 
Silver Chief claim— located at Tower, a small settlement about one and
^Ibid. Babcock to Taussig, November 3, 1885, Hope Papers. 
^The New Northwest, January 8, 1%R6, p. 3- 
^Babcock to Taussig, January 31, I886, Hope Papers.
oThe New Northwest, February I8, December 10, I886, pp. 3, 3<
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one-half miles east of Philipsbnrg. This claim had been purchased by 
the company, worked for a time, and then abandoned. A new deaft was 
dug on the Silver Chief, from which most of the ore was obtained 
during the year. The deposit discovered on this claim was not high 
in quality, running about 26 ounces per ton, and a good deal of work 
was expended in driving tunnels through barren ground, keeping expenses 
high. To remedy poor results, the Company again administered the medi­
cine of a new foreman, and Ballard gave way to L. M e r r i l l . T h e  
foreman, or superintendent, occupied a precarious position, with 
tenure apparently dependent upon results alone regardless of actual 
ability, and failure to show a profit occasioned a quick response by 
the directorate. In fairness to the corporation management, however, 
mining enterprises of the period were billed as a sure way to quick 
riches, and a year with no dividends often stirred the wrath of the 
stockholders who quickly clamored for returns on their investments.
The company mined and milled more than 10,000 tons of ore in 
1887, probably the largest amount processed in any one year during the 
history of the venture. A gross income of about .$260,000 was received 
at a cost of about $17$,000, leaving a net profit of some $85,000.
From this profit a scant $2,000 were paid in dividends with the re­
mainder probably used to cover losses during the previous years and a 
portion carried in reserve for future use.^^ Philipsburg was prosper­
ous, and the Northern Pacific Railroad extended a branch line to the
^^Ibid., May 5, June I6 , July lU, September 29, December 1,
1887, pp. h, 1, U, U, U.
^^Annual Report for 1887, Hope Papers. In IP87 new articles of 
incorporation increased the capital stock to $1,000,000. Montana, 
Secretary of State, Book D., p. 339.
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thriving mining center.
During most of 1888 the Hope mill ran op ore from the Silver 
Chief, but by May the supply was apparently approaching exhaustion, 
and exploration began on the Lady Byron claim. Prospecting also com­
menced on the Field and Check lodes, and a month later new deposits 
were found in the Silver Chief which were apparently of a nature which
1 pcould best be reduced by smelting. In addition to running the mill,
the company made use of the new railroad facilities, and in four months
213 tons of ore averaging more than 80 ounces of silver per ton were
13shipped from the Silver Chief.
The mill ran almost constantly during 1888, crushing about 8,$bO 
tons of ore from which about $1^7,000 were received at a cost of 
$161,00 0. The company paid $50,000 in dividends, it would seem, how­
ever, mainly from profits made in 188?.^ Although the year was poor 
from a financial standpoint, the Company had conducted extensive ex­
ploration and gained some better knowledge of the mineral deposits.
The first union also appeared in 1888. In October the Granite Miners' 
Union was formed with a membership of 200 men and soon became the 
strongest organization in the community. The union had no known 
national affiliation, and after the panic of 1893, it performed indif­
ferently, lingered until 1910, and quietly died because it could
12.'The Philipsburg Mail (Philipsburg, Montana), May 17, June 28,
1888, pp. 3, 1.
13Annual Report for 188^, Hope Papers.
^bid.
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perform no necessary function during the long depression when unions
were in a very poor position to make demands on management,Late
in the year a discovery at the Porter lode, running 79 ounces per ton,
was claimed, but the glimmer of precious metal existed mainly in a
newspaper editor's eye.
The mill operated only about half the time during 1889, It was
closed down in May because of insufficient ore, operated for a short
time in September, and then probably closed once more. Exploration
work at the mine continued although the labor force was reduced by
17half in May, increased in September, and then reduced once more.
The Company sustained a loss of about $2h,000 in l889. When 
the deposits in the Silver Chief and Porter lodes ran out, a lack of 
sufficient ore— a chronic problem— plagued the Company again. A por­
tion of Silver Chief ore was again shipped out for smelting, and 
although silver prices dropped slightly, they still averaged 93*5 
cents per ounce— sufficient incentive to silver men. There is no 
evidence that the directorate responded to the admission of the sister 
states of North and South Dakota, Washington, and Montana in 1889 even 
though these states would add eight new senators and help shift the 
balance of power in the upper house of Congress,
Unfortunately, no annual report for 1890 is available, but with 
the admission of Idaho and Wyoming the directors must have realized
^^Blumenthal, op, cit,, p, 69, The Philipsburg Mail, October U,
1888, p, 1,
^^bid., December 13, 1888, p, 1,
'̂̂ Ibid,, May 9, September 19, I889, pp. 1, 1,
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that silver’s political position was greatly enhanced. Because of the
loss in the previous year, president John C. Porter discharged W. W.
Adams as superintendent in February, and the following month several
men were at work on the Jubilee tunnel under the new superintendent,
"I AN. B. Ringeling— vrfno was appointed in April. Exploratory work prob­
ably continued during most of I89O, but the mill remained idle until 
19December. The Company ran short of money during the year and Porter
confided in Ringeling that "when the first of this month (December)
came around we had no money. The banks were in such a condition that
we did not like to offer our paper." As a temporary expedient. Porter
drew on his private funds for some $14,000 to meet the November pay- 
20roll. In December ore was being extracted from the Comanche claim
with an enlarged labor force, while the Silver Chief was abandoned—
?1the boilei* and hoist removed from the shaft. A loss was probably 
sustained for the second consecutive year even though the Sherman 
Silver Purchase Act was pushed through Congress and silver rose to 
more than one dollar per ounce.
Silver prices were high, and with expectations that they could 
be held up with political support from the new Western states, the 
company began an intensified search for ore deposits in 1%91— expending
^^Ibid., March 27, 1890, p. 1. Cuno to Porter, February 18, IP90 
and Cuno to Ringeling, April I6 , I89O, Hope Papers.
^^The Philipsburg Mail, December U, 1890, p. 1.
20Porter to Ringeling, December 23, I89O, Hope Papers.
^^The Philipsburg Mail, December 11, 18, l890,^pp. 1, 1.
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about $25 per ton on mining and development compared with about six 
dollars in the two previous years. The search bore few immediate 
fruits, however, and with the ore discovered in the older working de­
pleted, the mill paused in mid-January for repairs. A high grade 
deposit found in the Cuno shaft in February was not large enough to 
warrant starting the mill until a stockpile was assembled, and after a
22short run in April, the mill "hung up the stamps" the following month.
The Company reduced the mining force and continued to prospect for ore.
When this prospecting failed to uncover any additional supply, work
was abandoned on the Cuno shaft and emphasis shifted to the Jubilee
23tunnel —  steadily pushed into Hope hill. With no new ore in sight, 
president Porter came to Montana in September to inspect the Company’s 
operations, and as a result, the Silver Chief was permanently closed 
although prospecting continued on the Horton lode and in the Jubilee 
tunnel. In the interests of economy, Ringeling was instructed in 
December to cease operations on the Horton lode and discharge the 
miners except those working on the Jubilee tunnel.
The mill had operated 116 days during 1^91, recovering about 
80,000 ounces of silver that sold for about $85,000. Costs ran #83̂ 000,
P2Stevens to Cuno, January 29, 1891 and Ringeling to Porter, 
February 9, 17, and April 6, 1891, Hope Papers.
^^The Philipsburg Mail, May lU, 1891, p. 1. Ringeling to Cuno, 
June 2h, I89I and Ringeling to Porter, June 29, 1^91, Hope Papers.
^^The Philipsburg Mail, September 10, I896, p. 1. Ringeling 
to Porter, October 20 and November 17, 1891, Hope Papers.
—UU”
giving a modest profit of some $2,000. From the limited ore deposits 
found and the milling of custom ore, the company made enough money to 
expand its holdings, defend the present holdings against several law­
suits, and continue work on the Jubilee tunnel— no mean achievements. 
Although milling costs had not increased sharply, the cost per ton 
mined was four times as great as during 189^ and 1889, reflecting ex- 
panded prospecting work,  ̂ Estimates for funds during 1^91 indicate 
an average monthly requirement of about $U,^00-for Montana operations, 
labor accounting for more than eighty per cent of local costs probably 
because of the expanded explorations carried out.^^ This extensive 
prospecting, while costly at the time, proved more than worthwhile in 
the next two years.
The Company may have been tardy in paying the Montana joint 
owners who leased their claims to the corporation. At least these 
persons thought so, and in 1891 they began to press the Company for 
payments. By this time Byron Ballard, former superintendent of the 
Hope Company, had been employed by Granville Stuart to protect his 
interests. In August, Stuart warned Porter that a lawsuit would be 
instituted if the Company did not make a speedy and satisfactory 
settlement for ore taken from the leased ground. The Company responded 
with a statement that Stuart did not believe, and he bitterly called 
Porter the "cheekiest old robber" he had ever known. Stuart had been
2<Annual Report for 1891, Hope Papers.
Estimates for Funds, January, February, March, April, May, 
June, August, September, October, November, 1891, Hope Papers.
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mustering forces for so'ne time preparing an assault on the Company.
A year previously he had written Tom Stuart that he was getting the 
"Hope matter" in shape and expected to "tap them heavily before very 
long," and he also offered James A. Murray of Butte one-half of any 
proceeds in exchange for free legal assistance, Murray apparently de­
clined the offer, and Stuart retained William Scallon of Butte as his 
attorney. Stuart alleged that about 100,000 ounces of silver had been 
removed from the ground owned jointly by Montana men and leased to the 
Hope Company. With several other lawsuits threatening, the Company 
tried to mollify Stuart and gave him a statement of mining on the 
leased ground together with the expenses incurred. Rather than appeas­
ing him, the statement convinced Stuart that the expenses were padded 
to include total Company costs, and the report spurred him to further 
action. Wilson and Gillie, a civil and mining engineer firm of Butte, 
surveyed the ground, and after ascertaining the legality of such
action, Stuart seized the property leased to the Company, including 
27the Cuno shaft. Notices were posted that Stuart had possession of
the ground as a representative of the Montana joint-owners, and armed
28guards were posted to prevent trespassers.
Stuart's belligerent act moved the Company to submit a detailed 
statement to him showing about $1,700 due the Montana joint-owners.
27G. Stuart to T. Stuart, February 20, I89O. G. Stuart to 
James A, Murray, March 9, 1890. G. Stuart to Porter, August 31, I89I. 
G. Stuart to Hauser, September 15, 1^91. G. Stuart to Scallon, 
October 3, I891, Stuart Letterbook B.
28The Montana Mining Review, no. 37 (October 21, I891), p. 12.
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Upon a promise he would receive one-fourth of any money paid in the 
dispute and one-fifth of the ground each joint-owner possessed, Byron 
Ballard, a former superintendent for the Hope Company, acquired a 
vested interest in the controversy and joined the Stuart forces. With 
Ballard’s intimate knowledge, the Wilson and Gillie survey, and his 
suspicions reinforced by an indiscreet remark by the Company superin­
tendent that a good deal of ore had been removed from the leased ground, 
Stuart boldly reduced the Company’s cost statement from about $18,000 
to about $7,60 0. The Wilson and Gillie survey did support this reduc­
tion. Stuart’s adjustments showed that about $1|,500 were due the
Montana owners rather than $1,700 offered by the Company and there the
29matter rested at the end of I89I.
In spite of a decline in silver prices, 1892 was the most suc­
cessful year for the Hope Company because the exploration done in the 
Jubilee tunnel finally produced results. The mill stamps dropped a 
total of 256 days and crushed 6,286 tons of ore which produced more 
then S00,000 ounces of silver in 1892. This indicates nearly eighty 
ounces of the white metal recovered from each ton of ore crushed, and 
at an assumed recovery rate of about 65 per cent, the ore probably 
assayed more than ninety ounces per ton at the pit head— the richest 
ore yet found. After expenses of about $l60,000 were paid, the company 
declared dividends totaling $50,000 and established a reserve fund of
$100,000 for future emergencies, with the remaining $71,000 probably
30held in a working fund or used to repay outstanding indebtedness.^
29Stuart to Ballard, November 26, I89I, Stuart Letterbook B. 
^^Annual Report for 1892. Hope Papers,
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The Jubilee tunnel reached some 1,600 feet in length by the end of 
1892, with mining activity conducted on a modest scale.
In 1892 Granville Stuart also began mining operations on the 
Hope lode for himself and the other Montana joint-owners and during
32the period June through August realized a net profit of about $S00. 
Stuart's modest success, plus the rather ambiguous body of mineral 
law which made a mine operation vulnerable to legal attack, prompted 
A. A. McDonald to request a survey and underground examination of the 
Jubilee tunnel to determine if the Hope Company had transgressed on his 
holdings. McDonald owned the Garnet and Porter Extension lodes which 
apparently joined the Jubilee tunnel,The matter died out after a 
time, and a compromise settlement of $2,600 with the Montana joint- 
owners of leased ground ended a year of vexing legal battles for the 
Hope Company.Most of the lawsuits involved ownership of claims, a 
development probably resulting from the complicated law of ownership 
and the brighter mining outlook after the passage of the Sherman Act 
of 1890.
By early 1893 silver prices were falling, and efforts during the 
year were directed chiefly toward the mining and reduction of ore
^^ontana. Inspector of Mines. Fourth Annual Report (Helena, 
1893), pp. 26-27.
32Statement of Work on Hope Lode, September 22, 1892, Stuart 
Letterbook B.
33Ringeling to Forbis and Forbis, June lb., 1892. Ringeling to 
Porter, July 17, 1892, Hope Papers.
^ Ĝ. Stuart to T. Stuart, May 22, 1892, Stuart Letterbook B.
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uncovered in the Porter lode. By this time most of the ore found in 
the Jubilee tunnel had been taken out. The mill machinery worked for 
202 days, crushed 5^530 tons of ore, produced 313,000 ounces of silver, 
and paid $175,000 in dividends.The election of Cleveland, known for 
his opposition to the Bland-Allison Act of 18?8, did not bode well for 
the future of the white metal, however, and the failure of the Philadel­
phia and Reading Railroad on February 20 was an ominous sign. Astutely 
the directorate foresaw the impending storm and on February 23, more 
than two months before the National Cordage Company catalyzed the panic 
of 1893, Porter told Ringeling to market all bullion "as soon as pos­
sible" because of the "great anxiety concerning the future of silver."^ 
The New Northwest said in June the stamps of the "old reliable" Hope 
were "hung up" although the same force was retained at the mine and the
diamond drill was kept busy. Faithfully, the paper forecast that it
37would not be long before the mill was heard again. By mid-year the 
Granite and Bi-Metallic Companies had failed; the Northern Pacific 
Railroad quickly followed. But the Hope Company, pausing only shortly 
in August, continued to operate with bullion being shipped in every 
month except one, and a carload of ore was sent to Tacoma, (Washington) 
for smelting, with disappointing results^® At the close of 1893 the
^^Annual Report for 1893, Hope Papers.
^^Porter to Ringeling, February 23, 1893, Hope Papers.
^^The Philipsburg Mail, June 29, 1893, p. 1.
0 O
Tacoma Smelting and Refining Co. to John McIntyre, May 20, 
1893. Bullion Shipped Record, Hope Papers.
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Hope Company had absorbed the shock of the panic, with activity
39continued on a scale comparable to the previous prosperous year.
Indeed, with the sharp drop of prices, the Company added the Game 
Cock, W. C. Bryant, Kaiser, High Oar, Cara Cash, and West Hope lodes 
to its holdings, probably as a protection against further lawsuits.
How did the Hope Company survive the wave that engulfed the 
Granite Mountain and Bi-Metallic Mining Companies? All the reasons may 
never be fully known, but some are apparent.
The First Annual Report of Montana’s Bureau of Agriculture, 
Labor, and Industry contained a table showing dividends paid by Montana 
mines. Data in the report concerning Hope Company dividends are not 
entirely accurate, but the total reported is generally correct, and it 
is reasonable to assume that data concerning total dividends shown for 
the Granite and Bi-Metallic Mining Companies are roughly correct.
These data show dividends paid by the Bi-Metallic Company total­
ing 1.5 million dollars from 1890 through 1893 and h.3 million dollars 
paid by the Granite Company during those same years. Both companies 
were operated on a much larger scale than the Hope Company, and their 
extensive mines and mills required large costs to keep open. With 
large dividends paid, it seems probable that these companies had only 
small reserve funds on hand and the general depression precluded the
39Montana, Inspector of Mines, Fifth Annual Report (Helena, 
1893), p. U.
UO /Montana, Inspector of MLines, Sixth Annual Report (Helena, 
1891), p. 79.
^Montana, Bureau of Agriculture, Labor, and Industry, First 
Annual Report (Helena, 1893), P» 28?*
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possibility of raising more money. Even with a drop in silver prices 
below the level necessary for a profit, the Hope Company could run a 
considerable time at modest cost while the vastly larger operations 
of the Bi-Metallic and Granite Companies could produce very large 
debts in a short time. And it is also possible that the Hope Company, 
over its longer history, had adjusted itself to the most economic size 
while the Granite and Bi-Metallic may have over extended their acti­
vities in the quest for quick profits.
While silver prices continued to fall in I89U, the mill pounded 
away steadily— crushing 7,029 tons of ore in 290 days— justifying 
Philipsburg’s faith in its stability. The Company sold 312,000 ounces 
of silver for $186,000, made an estimated $1;1,000 net profit and paid 
$75,000 in dividends in the depression year.^^ This was accomplished 
either by shipping bullion produced in 1893, reducing the reserve fund, 
or both* With many men unemployed, labor cost declined and the Com­
pany seized on the opportunity by expanding the labor force almost 25
. U3per cent.
While the Company did survive the panic, indeed seemed to fare 
quite well, the depression dealt a near fatal blow to silver mining as 
an industry in Montana and seriously damaged Hauser. John W. Hakola, 
Hauser’s biographer, believes that the depression began Hauser’s 
financial fall. With Hauser’s extensive interests, any deterioration
^^Annual Report for 189U, Hope Papers.
^^Montana, Inspector of Mines, Sixth Annual Report (Helena,
189U), p. 79.
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in his position must have created financial shock waves felt widely 
in Montana.
CHAPTER V 
ACTIVITY DECLINES, 1895-1900
The depression which continued to grip the nation in 1895 also 
began to affect Hope Company activity, although a lack of high quality 
ore aggravated the problem. Some 1,762 tons of ore were passed through 
the mill in 7h days, yielding 5 0 ,0 0 0 ounces of silver which were sold 
for some $UU,000, and the Company probably showed a net loss of nearly 
$U0,000 in 1 8 95. Dividends amounting to $10,000 were distributed, but 
this represented profits from the last quarter of 189U and a reduction 
of the reserve fund to $50,000.^
The pace quickened again in I896, probably influenced by hopes 
for a favorable election, as William Jennings Bryan— aided by "Silver 
Dick" Bland (of Missouri)— articulately championed the cause of free 
silver which, despite Bryan*s able leadership, failed. The annual re­
port for 1896 glumly stated that all operations during the year were 
conducted through the Jubilee tunnel, with most of the ore passed 
through not worth mining. Construction of a new hoist on a raise from
the Jubilee tunnel to the surface began, however, and was completed
2several months later.
Silver prices, which had inched upward in 1895, dipped downward
^Annual Report for 1895. Hope Papers, 
2Annual Report for I896. ibid.
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following the defeat of Bryan. The mill, almost as if it could not 
believe the results of the election, exerted itself for 250 days in 
1896, oblivious to the fact that its days were numbered. Surprisingly, 
the Company fared quite well during the year, sold some 288,000 ounces 
of silver— retrieved from 6,265 tons of ore— for $170,000, paid $U0,000 
in dividends and increased the reserve fund to $55,000. The year was 
profitable, but not many good years followed.^
Unfortunately, no annual report is available for 1897, but 
operations appear to have been comparable to those of the previous 
year, although slightly more bullion was shipped,^ Bullion shipments 
were made every month, and in spite of a large gross product, the de­
clining price of silver made it quite possible that net profit was 
about equal to, or slightly less than, that of I896. The Company paid 
at least four dividends totaling a modest $3,200, and the Montana 
property was improved and expanded by the purchase in August of the 
Algonquin Company with water rights.^
Byron Ballard obstinately continued to mine in 1897 and provided 
some discomfiture for the company. In April, Porter instructed Ringel­
ing "in confidence" to watch Ballard carefully and make sure he did 
"not manage in some way to look into our mine."^ Ballard had allied
Ânnual Report for 1896, ibid.
^Bullion Shipped Record, ibid.
^Cuno to Ringeling, January 27, July 21, and August 18, 1897. 
Porter to Ringeling, May 19, 1897, ibid. Western Mining World 
(August 21, 1 8 9 9), p. UU7.
^Porter to Ringeling, April 2I4., 1897, Hope Papers. Underlining 
is shown as it appears in the original source.
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himself with A. A. McDonald and was mining in the Cnno works at this 
time. McDonald was dissatisfied with the expenses of mining, however, 
and in the course of offering his share for sale to Ringeling, McDonald 
mentioned that the Hope Company was so close to his ground that the 
drills could be heard turning. Ringeling put a door on the 230 foot 
level in the Cuno works, probably to quiet the sound, and Ballard, 
angered by the door, began to dig even harder. A short time later 
Ringeling told Porter that Ballard was attempting to apex the ore from 
the Cuno shaft, and that a Mr. Fletcher— former foreman of the Cuno 
shaft— was working with Ballard. Ringeling thought that if the ore 
did not enter other Hope Company claims they were safe, but if the vein 
did cross from the Cuno shaft to other holdings, the Company would have 
to prove it was an extension of one of their other ore veins.  ̂ No 
record of an agreement with Ballard is available, and he continued to 
mine for several years more.
This was the last year of extensive operations by the Company. 
Even though the precipitous plunge of silver prices was momentarily 
checked, the long-term outlook for the white metal was dim, and future 
activity expanded only in response to small price increases. The com­
pany apparently still had ore to be worked but only when the lure of 
profits justified an expansion of mining and milling activities.
Through an indifferent 1898, the mill reduced 3,38U tons of ore 
in 150 days, recovering 15U,000 ounces of silver bullion. Gross sales 
were about $101,000, while estimated expenses were about $135,000.
^Ringeling to Taussig, September 27, 1897, Hope Papers.
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Despite this activity, the Company paid $30,000 in dividends in 1898, 
apparently by reducing the $55,000 reserve fund. Extensive prospecting 
was carried on in a search for higher grade ore as prices began to 
move upward, and prospecting expenses— near $25 per ton— made up one-
Qthird of total operational expenses in Montana And Charles A. Cuno, 
secretary for more than ten years, died during the year and was re­
placed by W. C. Guels.
With the market somewhat stronger in 1898, the Bi-Metallic 
started fifty stamps at its mill in June,^ The operations were appar­
ently not successful enough to justify continued work, because by the 
end of the year only the Hope Company remained open in the Philipsburg 
area.^^ To minimize the cost of separate management, mining, and mill­
ing, the Granite Mountain was merged with the Bi-Metallic to become the 
Granite-Bimetallic Combination Mining Company, while the Hope continued 
to run.^^
Probably because of .conditions in the silver market, the possi­
bility of exploiting manganese ore had been investigated in 1897- No
T?buyers were found. In 1898 Ballard, still industriously mining, also 
began developing a manganese deposit, but his mining activity continued
O
Annual Report for 1898. ibid.
^The Philipsburg Mail, June 3, 1898, p. 2.
^^ontana. Bureau of Agriculture, Labor, aid Industry, Sixth 
Annual Report (Helena, 1898), p. 169.
^^Montana, Inspector of Mines, Tenth Annual Report (Helena, 
1898), p. 23.
^^Tacoma Smelting and Refining Co. to Hope Co., March lU, 1598, 
Hope Papers.
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marginal at best.^^ Although no one may have suspected it at the 
time, manganese was destined to replace silver as the principal prod­
uct of the Philipsburg mines.
Operations were further reduced during 1899. Ores recovered 
from the Shapleigh shaft and the Jubilee tunnel were of poor grade and 
the large ê q̂ ense of keeping water out of the Shapleigh shaft prevented 
extensive prospecting. The mill stamps dropped on almost the same 
amount of ore as during the previous year in slightly fewer days of 
activity. The proceeds for 1899 were only about $33,000, however, 
compared to $101,000 for the previous year. As in I898, a large amount 
of the total Montana expenses was spent on prospecting for new de­
posits.^
By mid-year the Granite - Bi metallic Company was running at 
full capacity, and Ballard continued to extract ore from the Cuno 
shaf t . T h e  Hope Company was not so prosperous. In July a complete 
closure was ordered, and the following month President Porter came to 
Philipsburg to inspect the mines and mill,^^ Operations began again 
in November, although probably on a reduced scale. The mines near 
Philipsburg were described as "scenes of renewed and great activity"
^^Hope Co. to Hope Co., April 13, 1̂ 98, ibid.
^^Annual Report for 1898. ibid.
^^The Philipsburg Mail. May 26, 1599, p. 1. Western Mining 
World. July 29, 1899, p. U6.
^^Hope Co. to Hope Co., July 27, 1899, Hope Papers, The 
Philipsburg Mail, August I8, 1899, p. 1.
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in late 1899, but the activity was to be short-lived.^^
Several new deposits were found in 1900, Except for that found 
on the Field lode, however, they were quickly exhausted or too poor in 
value to warrant extensive mining operations. The ore discovered dur­
ing the year paid the costs of mining and milling, but the cost of
prospecting was only partially recovered, with the company sustaining
1 Aa loss for the year. Estimated income balanced against costs in­
dicates a loss of about $lU,000, but because the judgment is based 
upon two estimated figures, it is possible that the loss was somewhat 
less.
After a feeble rise the silver market weakened again in 1900 
while the Hope Mill lazily reduced U,36l tons of ore in about 175 days, 
recovering some 102,000 ounces of the white m e ta l . T h e  nation 
clearly declared for the gold standard in 1900, and the silver sold 
by the Company brought only about $61,000. Expenses ran more than this 
amount, near $75,000, and a net loss was again incurred. Silver mining 
was becoming steadily less profitable, and the end of the Hope Company 
was near.
l?Montana, Bureau of Agriculture, Labor, and Industry, Extra 
Edition of Vçæ Sixth Annual Report (Helena, 1899), p. 21.
^^Annual Report for 1900, Hope Papers. 
l̂ Ibid.
CHAPTER VI 
END OF THE HOPE MINING COMPANY, 1901-10
By 1901 the directors of the Hope Company probably knew that 
the corporation's strength was rapidly ebbing. Slowly, almost reluc­
tantly, the company began to die, with the hoist closed in February, 
the labor force reduced in November, and all life disappearing the 
following month.^ Western Mining World remained loyal to the Company, 
saying that this was not the first time it had closed, but this closure 
was the last. The mill remained inactive until late 1903, and by that 
time the Company had ceased to exist.
Like many other mining corporations, the Hope Company died a 
lingering death. In 1902 the holdings passed to a new corporation 
known as the Goodhope Mining Company with John C. Porter and John J, 
Taussig of the old Hope Company retaining substantial interest in the
new organization, although control was gradually passing to one Paul A.
3Fusz,^ Probably to provide continuity, and because no loss of control 
resulted, the secretary of the Hope Company was retained in that 
position,^ The Philipsburg works stood idle throughout the year. The
^The Philipsburg Mail. February 22, November 8, December 6,
1901, pp. 8, 8, 8,
2Western Mining World. December li|., 1901, p. 21 
^Montana, Secretary of State, Document no. 1987. 
\festern Mining World, April 19, 1902, p. 15,
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new company, like its predecessor, was a Missouri corporation firmly 
controlled by St, Louis interests.
With renewed vigor the Goodhope Company set to work at Philips­
burg, and the residents heard the mill pound steadily from 1902 until 
mid-1906, when the company paused to reorganize once more. As if 
hoping to recapture some of the prosperity the enterprise had once 
known, the newborn corporation was again styled the Hope Company.
A. B. Ewing reappeared as a director of the reorganized venture— he 
had sat on the boards of both the Granite and Bi-Metallic Companies—  
as did Paul A. Fusz, former director of the Bi-Metallic Company. John 
C. Porter, who had guided the Company fortunes for more than a decade 
(1890 through 1900), was gone, and the ownership of his vice-president, 
J. J. Taussig, was reduced to one share.^
The reorganization was a tonic but not a cure for the ills be­
setting the company, and although the new directors managed to move the 
rusting corporate machinery during the summer months of 1907 and 190%, 
proceeds from both years were extremely small. After these dates only 
one report of bullion shipped appeared. In 1909 the company shipped 
five bars of bullion, probably from a final clean-up at the mine and 
mill.^
In 1911 the property of the Hope Company passed to the Philips­
burg Mining Company, another creature of Missouri, completely owned by 
Missourians, Although Fusz remained as a major stockholder, control
Montana, Secretary of State, Document no, 5975. 
'̂ Bullion Shipped Record, Hope Papers.
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of the new company rested with Max Kotany of St. Louis.^ The Hope 
Company had now completely disappeared. Operations had been curtailed 
for two years, and even after the property passed to the Philipsburg 
Mining Company, activity was almost nonexistent for some time. In 1912 
the Montana Inspector of Mines reported that operations during the 
previous two years had been done by lessees who had confined their 
activity to prospecting or working on pillars of ore left by the
Oearlier mining ventures. One authority observed that the final phase 
in nearly all the Western mining camps was an era of leasing after the 
mines had reached the point where operation by a company was no longer 
profitable.^ The Hope had reached that point. Silver mining was no 
longer profitable in Montana, and exploitation of the white metal 
ceased to be a major industry in the state.
^Montana, Secretary of State, Document no. 6829.
^Montana, Inspector of Mines, Report for 1911-1912 (Helena, 
1912), p. 6a.
^Theodore J. Hoover, Economics of Mining (3d ed.; Stanford, 
California: Stanford University Press, 195U), p. 136.
CHAPTER VII 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The St. Louis and Montana Mining Company's mode of business 
operation is not known. With its business office located in St. Louis 
and most funds drawn from there, it seems probable that a good deal of 
control was attempted from that city. An executive committee with some 
discretionary powers did exist in Montana, however, and day-to-day con­
trol was probably in the hands of that committee. The St. Louis office 
appears to have conducted financial business with its Montana committee 
through S. T. Hauser, while James Stuart was in charge of mining opera­
tions at Philipsburg.
With the establishment of the Hope Mining Company in 1R72, a 
new method of conducting business evolved with St. Louis interests 
taking firm control of the company. Although the first evidence of 
this new method did not appear until the early lP80's, it seems likely 
that the change accompanied the 1872 shift of control. James Stuart 
had left the company before the reorganization, and the superintendent—  
with his tenure dependent upon continued succèss-was appointed by St. 
Louis from that time on.
Under the new system almost all business was conducted by the 
home office. Bullion was shipped to the Chicago and Aurora Smelting 
and Refinery Company, and the product from smelting was forwarded to 
New York, There the silver was sold by the American Exchange National
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Bank, and the proceeds credited to the Hope Mining Company account
with the State Savings Bank of St. Louis,^
A monthly estimate of funds required for operations, together 
with a detailed report of mining and milling activities, was forwarded 
to St. Louis from Montana. The necessary funds were transferred to the 
Hope Company account with the First National Bank of Helena, Montana, 
against which the Montana superintendent could draw. St. Louis also 
watched reports of mining and milling activities closely. From these 
reports and their own financial accounts, the home office exercised 
continuing effective control and provided detailed guidance for the 
Montana superintendent. Only those supplies that could be procured 
locally were purchased in Montana. In this category were lumber and 
timber, coal and wood. Most other items such as salt, quicksilver,
powder and miscellaneous tools and supplies were probably purchased
by St. Louis for the Montana office. Evidently the entire procedure 
was designed to maintain the maximum possible control in St. Louis. 
While this system had merits in that the superintendent was not bur­
dened by accounting, it also had serious liabilities. At times, 
although perhaps only when operations were marginal, the superintendent 
seemed unaware that the company was incurring a loss until he learned 
otherwise from the home office.
Although a bookkeeper was employed in Montana, accounting was 
done primarily in St. Louis. At the end of the fiscal year an inven­
tory list was forwarded to the city office. This list was balanced
^Cuno to Ringeling, June 29, 1B95» Hope Papers.
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against home office ledger accounts and Montana advised of the entries 
necessary to balance the books. After receiving the adjusted accounts 
and additional financial information from St. Louis, the Montana book­
keeper drew up a report concerning operations for the year. This report 
was forwarded to St. Louis where the balance sheet and annual report to 
the stockholders were drawn up. The method was cumbersome and costly. 
One writer estimates that an additional cost of 20 to 33 per cent of 
operating profit is necessary to maintain a city office. This esti­
mate appears high for the Hope Mining Company, but the city office may 
have accounted for more than sixteen per cent of total expenses. The 
economy of a single office was sacrificed for greater control by the 
home office.
The pattern of the Hope Company’s shift of control is somewhat 
characteristic of Montana mining ventures. Claims, of course, had to 
be discovered by persons present in Montana. With the exception of 
simple placer operations, however, these claims could be exploited 
only after considerable capital investments had been made. Investment 
capital of the necessary magnitude did not exist in Montana in most 
cases. For this reason Montana claim owners often acquired capital 
from financial centers of the country— New York, Philadelphia, San 
Francisco and, in this particular case, St. Louis. In most cases 
control followed the capital, with Montana claim owners gradually 
losing control of the mining venture. In the case of the Hope Mining
2For further data on foreign corporations in Montana during 
the territorial period, see a forthcoming thesis being written by 
Patrick McLatchy at Montana State University, Missoula, Montana
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Company the loss of control occurred in 18?2 with the reorganization 
of that year.
There have been constant complaints that Montana was plundered 
by eastern capitalists. One must concede, however, that investment 
capital performs a vital function in the productive process and should 
earn returns in proportion to D̂ iat it lends to production. The crucial 
question is not the right to a return from capital invested, but 
rather a quantitative "how much." This quantitative judgment is espe­
cially important in regard to an extractive industry like mining where 
mineral resources are removed and cannot be replaced. Certainly the 
major portion of the profits from the Hope Mining Company, like many 
other mining ventures in Montana, was realized by outside investors.
Viewed generally, and also specifically in regard to Montana, it 
is questionable if the mining of precious metals ever repaid the total 
costs involved in the industry. Because it is impossible to assign 
finite values to such things as the time and labor expended, lives 
lost, misery endured, and greed and crime associated with the search 
for gold and silver-one can perhaps pass over the moot question of 
whether the mining of precious metals ever repaid total costs and 
consider if outside capital invested in the Hope Company compensated 
for the loss of local control.
On the credit side, we have already mentioned that the St. Louis 
and Montana Mining Company provided an economic base for other indus­
tries such as agriculture, lumbering, trade and transportation. This 
Company also brought some talented men into the territory with at least 
one, G. C. Swallow, who became Montana’s first state inspector of
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mines, remaining. The St, Louis and Montana Company also added some 
stability to the "boom and bust" economy of the territory.
The Hope Company displayed some of these same good points. Cer­
tainly it was one continuing source of tax revenue for Deer Lodge and, 
later. Granite county for more than forty years. Although the state 
and local taxes paid were probably not a great source of income for 
government, the company also met a payroll— at least intermittently—  
for nearly half a century. But there is little reason to credit the 
Hope Company with bringing new talent into Montana.
On the debit side, the loss of control meant that Montana faced 
a corporation organized and controlled in Missouri with most of the 
profits made by St. Louis investors. The company did indeed spawn and 
nurture Philipsburg, yet the town continued to exist after the company 
was gone, with little decrease in population. Agriculture, lumber, 
trade and transport were stimulated, but one wonders if these indus­
tries would not have come to the Philipsburg area without the Hope 
Company. And if they had come later, they might have been more bene­
ficial to Montana. Certainly if lumbering had been delayed for fifty 
years the methods of exploitation would have been quite different.
What if the Northern Pacific had been delayed twenty years?
While the capital necessary to begin the Hope Company probably 
did not exist in Montana in the l860’s, investment funds of the neces­
sary magnitude (some $250,000 initial investment) would have been 
available at a later time. There is little reason to believe that the 
methods and motives of a Montana investor would have been different 
from those of a St, Louis investor. Yet, it is possible that the
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Montana capitalist might have been more responsive to the needs of 
Montana, and— if he made money— might have looked to Montana for fur­
ther investment of the profits made.
Today the rotting, empty shell of the Granite-Bimetallic mill 
stands a mile or slightly more southeast of Philipsburg. In a small 
gulch at the head of Main Street is one small building surrounded by 
the rubble that was once the Hope Mill. Scattered bits of rusted 
machinery litter the countryside between these ruins while piles of raw 
earth and tailings mark the sites of other mines and mills. And, less 
visible to the eye, indeed almost incomprehensible to the casual visit­
or, the miles of tunnels and underground caverns mark the places where 
mineral wealth once existed. While it is impossible to objectively 
measure the values involved and reach an unbiased conclusion, the 
question arises; Could Montana have fared much worse? The benefits 
derived locally certainly do not appear to have compensated for the 
loss of control.
There are numerous reasons for the failure of the Hope Company, 
but the fall of silver prices, gradual at first and then accelerated 
after I89I, was the chief reason. Although prices determined the 
quality of ore from which a profit could be made, the quantity of ore 
was also a chronic problem. Extensive exploration was carried on with 
a diamond drill, but the problem of adequate ore deposits was not 
really solved until 1892. And by that time, prices were falling fast. 
Milling techniques rose quickly from about UO per cent recovery of 
assay value at the mill in the l860’s to about 85 per cent by the mid- 
1 8 8 0's. After 1893, however, increases in recovery rates were
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beginning to level out and could not compensate for falling prices.
Several other factors made mining in Montana a high-cost indus­
try. Geographically the mines were located inland in an isolated area 
with high transport costs. These costs affected not only machinery and 
supplies coming in, but also products shipped out for sale. The long 
distance from markets made it impossible, for a time, to exploit other 
minerals, such as lead, which were often found with the silver-bearing 
ore. The geographic location also caused delays waiting for necessary 
supplies.
The history of the Hope Mining Company in some respects reflects 
the history of silver mining as an industry in Montana. In other res­
pects it is unique. Like many other companies it began with outside 
capital and Montana stockholders gradually lost control to the outside 
investors. It began with little technical knowledge and rapidly im­
proved its methods. Yet, by the time the Company had gained the know­
ledge necessary for efficient mining, silver exploitation as an industry 
in Montana was dying. In these respects it is like many other companies.
Unlike many other companies, the Hope Company was most success­
ful in terms of longevity, lasting for more than forty years. This 
long period of existence, however, distorts the financial picture 
somewhat. Dividends paid between 188U and 1900 amounted to about 
$5 0 0,00 0, much less than those paid by the giants of Philipsburg, the 
Granite and Bi-Metallic Companies. Assuming that all stock was paid up 
and a maximum of a million dollars paid in dividends in forty years, 
the rate of return on initial capital invested was about ten per cent 
per year. If all estimated capital invested is considered, however.
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the return was nearer four per cent.^ This would be a fair, but less 
than spectacular return, especially for a mining venture. The Company 
was not an easy, quick way to wealth nor was it a failure, but rather a 
sound, steady business venture.
While an extended discussion of the factors affecting silver 
prices is beyond the scope of this study, some mention should be made 
of these factors. Silver had value as a commodity and also as monetary 
metal which could be used for fractional coins or backing for currency. 
The commodity uses were limited to such items as photographic uses, 
mirror making, silverware, and miscellaneous other items,^ The quan­
tity needed for these items was quite limited. Monetary uses of silver 
could be expanded through political action incited by currency reformers 
and businessmen concerned with the growing needs of trade.
Until 1873 a good deal of silver was used to back modern curren­
cies, with Great Britain the only major nation on the gold standard.
In 1873 Germany adopted the gold standard and began to dispose of its 
demonetized silver, with the Scandinavian Monetary Conference (Norway, 
Sweden, and Deimark) following suit.^ Thus, with world production
^In either case these estimates are based on the assumption 
that the original stockholders retained their interests for the entire 
life of the Company, It is probable that this was not true, and that 
the stockholders of the original company lost money while the persons 
owning stock in 1892 and 1%93 may have received a very good return on 
their investment.
S. Leong, Silver: An Analysis of Factors Affecting Its
Price (Washington: The Brookings Institute, 193U), p. 38.
^Ibid., p. 2.
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rapidly rising, a number of important nations were no longer consumers 
of the metal for monetary purposes, although France, Belgium and Lux­
embourg did continue to use simll amounts. India and China were major 
consumers. The demand of these nations rested to some extent on their 
volume of foreigh trade, but India, especially, absorbed an enormous 
amount of silver for ornaments. Coins were often melted down for these 
ornaments, resulting in a constant demand for silver to replenish the 
monetary supply.^ United States demand also declined when the Coinage 
Act of 1873 failed to mention silver and in effect demonetized it.?
With this omission and the panic of 18?3 contributing to falling prices, 
it is not surprising that the Hope Company spent several years rearrang­
ing business affairs after the failure of the St. Louis and Montana 
Company in 1872.
Ihe omission of silver from the Coinage Act of 1873 became a 
political issue known as the "Crime of '73»" When the Specie Resump­
tion Act of 1875 eliminated greenbacks as a political issue, the easy- 
credit advocates turned to silver as a political symbol and an 
inflationary device intended to reverse the general price decline 
which was a marked feature of the age. Farmers were especially con­
cerned in the matter. Silver satisfied the requirement that there 
be bullion backing for currency, insured an expansion of the money
Ĵ. Laurence Laughlin, A History of Bimetallism in the United 
States (New York; D. Appleton and Co., 1901), p. 109.
7Samuel E. Morison and Henry S. Commager, The Growth of the 
American Republic (Uth ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 19^3),
II, p. 2I4.5 .
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supply, and had the backing of silver mine owners and interests.^
In 1878 the Bland-Allison Act was passed over a presidential 
veto. This Act provided that the government must purchase not less 
than two nor more than four million dollars worth of silver monthly, 
to be coined into silver dollars at the existing legal ratio with 
gold. This purchase for monetary use did not compensate for increased 
production, and the price continued to fall. An international confer­
ence held in Paris during I878 also failed to increase the monetary 
demand as did several later conferences. The United States delegate 
advocated bi-metallism at the I878 conference, but only Italy agreed. 
France would not consent to bi-metallism. Great Britain sent a repre­
sentative who would not commit his government, Germany refused to send 
delegates, Russia and Austria were noncommittal, while Belgium, Switzer­
land and the Scandinavian states favored gold.^^ A second conference 
held in I88I was equally disappointing.^^
By 1890 the enabling acts of 1889 and I89O had brought six new 
western states into the Union and the balance of power shifted in Con­
gress. Through this shift of power the Sherman Silver Purchase Act of 
1890 was passed, with the Hope Company responding by spending a good 
deal of money on prospecting for ore. The Act required the government
g
Ibid. , p. 2UI|.
^Ibid.. p. 2U6 .
A. Barton Hepburn, A History of Currency in the United States. 
(New York: The Macmillan Co., 1915)> PP* 28h-85.
Laughlin, op. cit., p. 2U7.
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to purchase U.5 million ounces of silver each month at current market
prices. The Act also provided that silver be purchased with Treasury
12notes redeemable in gold or silver at tiie Secretary's discretion.
A final attempt by the United States to secure international bi­
metallism at a conference in Brussels during 1892 witnessed another 
failure.The failure of this conference and the depression of 1°93 
caused a sharp drop in silver prices. Because the Sherman Act provided 
that Treasury notes issued with silver backing were redeemable in gold 
or silver, gold reserves— for a number of reasons which need not detain 
us here— were rapidly drained from the Federal Treasury, In August, 
1893, President Cleveland called a special session of Congress to 
secure the repeal of the Sherman Act, and silver prices fell even 
lower.India, a large consumer of silver for monetary purposes had 
closed her mints to silver in I89O.
The Hope Company continued to operate in 1393 even though the 
Granite and Bi-Metallic Companies— for reasons already discussed—  
failed. Yet, in 1899, the then combined Granite - Bimetallic was more 
prosperous than the Hope Company. The reason was probably the more ex­
tensive ore deposits of the Granite - Bimetallic which were also of 
better quality. Although differing in many respects, neither the Hope 
nor the Granite = Bimetallic could survive the slow death of silver 
mining as an industry in Montana. By 1912 about seventy-five ner cent
l^Morison and Commager, op.cit., p. 2U?. 
^%epbum, op. cit., p. ,
-^^orison and Commager, op ,cit,, p. 2$1,
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of Montana's silver production was the by-product of copper refining 
and a substantial portion of the remainder a by-product of zinc mining,
APPENDIX A 
STATISTICAL TABLES
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Table 1
Directors of Selected Mining Companies 
1866-1911
St. Louis and 
Montana Mining 
Co: - 1866
Hope Mining 
Co.’
1872
Granite Mountain 
Mining Co.2 
1881
Bi-Metallic 
Mining Co.̂  
1886
Goodhope 
Mining Co.̂  
1902
Hope Mining Co.5
1907
Philipsburg 
Mining Co. 
1911
J. How 
W. D 'Oench 
S. Treat 
J.O. Broadhead 
S.T. Hauser 
W.B. Dance 
James Stuart
G.W. Parker 
L.M. Kennett
F.Ringeling^
J. Kirkead 
C.F. Meyer
C.C.Whittlesey
F. McArdle'î
W.C. Kennett
L. Duestrow J. N.Bofinger 
J. M, Merrell
J. C. Porter
8
O.J. Wilhelmi 
J.R. Lucas 
O.J, Olshauser 
E.P. Olshauser
E. S. Orr 
J. P. Hartnett 
E. Barklage
S. Gaty S. Gaty
E. Harrison̂ !e. Harrison
D.A. January*̂  'j.S. January
H.J. McKellops
A.F. Shaplgigh A.F. Shapleigh
W.L. Ewings 
C. Taussig'
A.B. Ewing
H.J. McKellops N.W. Ewing
C. Taussig ____
C. Clark
L.M. Rumsey L.M. Rumse .11
A.B. Ewing^
  J.J. Taussig
C. Clark
A.L. Shapleigh
A.B. Ewing Mark Ewing I
J.J. Taussig J.J. Taussig
M. Rumsey!5rii10
L.M. Rumsey,Jr L.M. Rumsey,Jr. L.M. Rumsey,Jr.
H, Rumsey H.S. Rumsey
C.D. McLure ^IC.D. McLure 
P.A. Fusẑ Oŷ -ip.A. Fusz
H.S. Rumsey
P.A. Fusz F.D. Fusz
J.H. Dieckman J.H. Dieckman J.H. Dieckman
Max Kotany Max Kotany Max Kotany
115-16. -̂ Ibid., Book P., p. 86-88.T
^Ibid., Document no. 1987. ____  ___
Ŝtockholders in the St. Louis and Montana Mining Company.
Ôfficers of the Missouri Petroleum and Mining Company 
9A James Harrison was a stockholder in the St. Louis and Montana Mining Company.
’̂̂Tht'se men with D. Jankower formed the Board of Directors of the American Gem Mining Syndicate.
Montana Secretary of State, Book T., p. 106-09.
llphese men plus C. Jagels formed the Board of Directors of the Montana later, Electric Power and Mining 
Company, Montana Secretary of State, Document no. 1371.
Montana, Secretary of State^ Book A. Îbid., Book B., p 
Ibid., Doc. no. 5975. Ibid., Doc. no. 6829.
p. 151.
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Table 2
List of Hope Mining Company Property 
and Subsequent Ownership^
Claim Subsequent Owners
Check, Cross, Constant, 
Comanche, Dashaway, 
Field Fraction, Game 
Cock, Homestead, High 
Oar, Hope Mill Site, 
Kaiser, Little Emma, 
Prince Imperial,
Porter, Potosi, 
Shapleigh, Take All, 
Wabus
Philipsburg
Mining
Company
J. C. Yob Peter Antonelli
Cliff No. 2 Extension 
East, Durango Mill 
Site, Monarch, Nellon 
Reservoir Site,
Ora Cash, Taussig, 
Seal Rock, Salmon
Contact
Mines
Cliff No, 2 and No. 5 Taylor Knapp 
Company^
Bay Horse and Mill Site, 
Durango, Estil, Silver 
Chief and Mill Site, 
Tariff, True Fissure, 
Walter B. Dance,
W. C. Bryant
Moorlight 
Mining 
C ompany
Algonquin, Bell, 
Dead Horse
Trout 
Mining 
C ompanv
American Mining 
and Metals, Inc.
Caledonia, Hope Mill Site, 
Lady Byron, Midnight, Sam 
Gaty, Reliance, Taussig
Miscellaneous Owners
Granite County, Montana. Office of the Clerk and Recorder. 
Lots and Lands, Book I.
2All claims except Durango and Estil had intermediate owners 
before being acquired by Taylor Knapp Company.
Table 3
Summary of Hope Mining Company Operations 
1884-1900 ̂
Silver Bullion Dividends Reserve
Produced Proceeds Expenses Paid Fund
Year (Thousand Ounces) (Thousand Dollars) (Thousand Dollars) (Thousand Dollars) (Thousand Dollars)
1884 N,A, N.A, / 
119.3-/
N.A. / 56.5 None
1885 121,8 140.5 %
129.5
N.A. None
1886 112,3 N.A,^/ None
1887
a/
264.0 É/ 258.0 175.9 , 
161.0 £ /
2. 0É/ None
1888 167.2 . 
129.5 5 /
157.4 50.0 None
1889 121,0 144.9 None None
1890 N,A. N,A. N.A. N.A. None
1891 79.5 85,0 82,7 .
158.3
153.3 ^
145.0 £ /
None None
1892 443.3
384.0:^)
311.7 y,
50.2
287.5
380.8 50.0 100,0
1893 306,5 175.0 N.A.
1894 186.0 75.0 N.A.
1895 43.8 83.0 
122,7 V
10,0 50,0
1896 170.5 40,0 55.0
1897 N.A, ,
153.5 ^  
62.0 
102,3 1/
N.A. N.A. .
134.7 ^
95.8 5 /  
74.5 ^
N.A, N.A.
1898 100.5 30.0 N.A.
1899 32,6 , 
61,0&/
None 2,0
1900 N.A. 2.1
I
01
if-
c/
'Unless otherwise indicated, data are from Hope Papers, Annual Reports, 1884-1900. 
Estimate based on reported ounces produced at 98 cents per ounce.
The years for which data exist (1889 and 1891) indicate that expenses at St. Louis averaged
about 16,66 per cent of Montana expenses. Except where total expenses were reported (188?, 1889, and
1891) Montana expenses were increased by 16,66 per cent to estimate total expenses.
"̂ T̂he Philipsburg Mail, May 2, 1889, p. 1.
'̂̂ tima.te based on reported proceeds at 93.5 cents per ounce.
/Ounces shipped reported in Annual Reports. Figures for 1884-91 are ounces produced. 
^Estimate based on ounces shipped at 59.6 cents per ounce.
Table 4
Hope Mining Company Bullion (Silver Bars) Shipped Record, 1892-1909
Year Jan. Feb. March April May June July Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec. YearlyTotals
1892 N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 16 74 N.A.
1893 21 8 20 19 13 16 2 0 14 16 6 1 136
1894 19 29 15 9 12 21 16 17 15 19 16 12 200
1895 3 0 0 0 0 7 2 N.A. N.A. 5 0 0 17
1896 0 7 13 15 20 20 18 29 22 24 18 26 212
1897 17 16 20 19 20 18 21 26 29 19 25 23 253
1898 20 19 15 5 0 8 7 0 0 0 7 6 87
1899 12 8 5 0 2 4 3 0 6 7 8 4 59
1900 8 3 6 7 9 4 5 8 3 0 9 0 62
1901 13 0 2 8 4 6 6 2 4 2 3 1 51
1902 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
1903 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 14 17 31
1904 13 16 12 8 12 12 14 12 12 4 6 8 129
1905 12 4 8 13 8 8 12 8 8 6 4 2 93
1906 2 5 0 0 4 8 3 6 0 0 0 0 28
1907 0 0 0 0 2 6 6 4 4 2 7 0 31
1908 0 0 0 0 6 4 8 6 7 6 0 n 37
1909 0 0 0 0 0 5 N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 5
I
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The Hope Mining Company Mine and Mill
Hope Hill is located about one mile northeast of Philipsburg 
and is honeycombed with miles of intersecting workings. The Jubilee 
tunnel entered the west slope of the hill at an elevation of about 5,500 
feet and was driven to the Shapleigh shaft which was intersected about 
5U0 feet from the portal of the tunnel. On the tunnel level about 6,000 
feet of drifts and crosscuts were driven. The Shapleigh shaft was 570 
feet deep. The Jubilee tunnel intersected the shaft at a depth of about 
100 feet, and below this, levels were driven out at depths of about 200, 
Loo, and 570 feet. These levels were connected with the tunnel by 
winzes, stopes, and inclines. After intersecting the Shapleigh shaft, 
the Jubilee tunnel continued eastward to the base of the Porter incline 
and through it was connected to the Porter workings above. Through 
torturous raises, drifts and cross cuts, the Jubilee tunnel connected 
with the Field and Cuno shafts to the southeast and also with the orig­
inal Hope Discovery workings.^
The Hope Mill is in ruins today. Only portions of the original 
stone structure stand at the eastern end of the main street of Philips­
burg, testifying to an earlier and more prosperous age for silver mining. 
The mill used a pan amalgamation process which was developed in the 
Washoe district of Nevada to treat silver ores. This process depends 
upon certain chemical processes and reactions. The pan was an upright
H. Emmons and F. C. Galkins, Geology and Ore Deposits of the 
Philipsburg Quadrangle Montana. U. S. Geological Survey Professional 
Paper No. 78 (Washington; U. S. Government Printing Office, 1913), p.213.
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cylindrical vat about 5 feet in diameter and 2 feet deep, made of iron 
or wood shod with iron. A muller, or iron disk, slightly smaller than 
the bottom of the vat, moved with a rotary motion mixing and grinding 
the ore. From this pan the ore went to settling reservoirs as a pasty 
mud. Salt, mercury and copper sulphate were "charged" into the pan and 
reacted on the silver sulphide and silver chloride. In the presence of 
iron, mercury frees the silver from sulphide and chloride compounds and 
forms amalgam. Iron reduced the mercuric chloride formed to mercury. 
Copper sulphate reacted on common salt and, in the presence of iron, 
formed cuprous chloride which reacted on silver sulphide and to some 
extent on sulpharsenates and sulphantimonates of silver. Heat, sup­
plied in the form of steam to the pans, facilitated the reaction. After
about eight hours grinding in the pans, the pulp passed to water to
2facilitate separation of mercury and amalgam.
A diagram of the process used at the Hope Mill is shown on the 
following page. This process remained essentially unchanged throughout 
the history of the company.^
^Ibid,, pp, 19h-9^. 
Îbid., p, 19$,
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Schematic Drawing of Process Used by Hope Mill
Ten Stamps
Three settlers
Mixing floor
Ruffled flume
Six pans
Salt, mercury and 
copper sulphate
Seven by ten Blake 
Crusher^
Settling reservoirs 
to thicken pulp
crusher with one fixed jaw plate and one pivoted at the 
top so as to give the greatest movement on the smallest lump. 
Albert H. Fay, A Glossary of the Mining and Mineral Industry, 
Department of the Interior, Bureau of Mines (Washington, D. C. : 
Government Printing Office, 1920), p. 83.
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BIOGRAPHICAL DATA
A. Directors of the St. Louis and Montana Mining Company
James 0. Broadhead was a former U. S. attorney for the eastern 
district of Missouri, former provost marshall for 
Missouri, a long-time state politician, and a member of 
the law firm of Sharp and Broadhead
W. B. Dance was a member of the Montana executive committee and also 
associated with the firm of Dance, Stuart and Company.
William D'Oench was associated with William D ’Oench and Company and 
president of the Franklin Savings Institution.
Samuel Gaty was of the Gaty, McCune and Glasby foundry.
Samuel T. Hauser was a member of the Montana executive committee.
Hauser was bom in Kentucky in 1833 and went to Montana 
with W. B. Dance after working for railroads in Missouri 
for eight years as a civil engineer. In 1865 he organized 
a bank at Virginia City in partnership with N. P. Langford 
and one year later founded the First National Bank of 
Helena. Later Hauser owned banks in Butte, Ft. Benton and 
Missoula and engaged in almost every conceivable invest­
ment venture in Montana. He was appointed Governor of 
the territory in 1885 by Cleveland and later became the 
first chief executive of the State. For a complete biog­
raphy of this important Montana capitalist, see the forth­
coming study by John W. Hakola.
John How was presndent of the State Savings Institution, a former
mayor of St. Louis and senior member of the firms of John 
How and Sons and of How, Harrington and Company.
L. M. Kennett was a former mayor of St. Louis, cousin of Hauser,
former representative to Congress, and a director of the 
Boatman's Savings Institution.
George W. Parker’s business affiliations are unknown,
James Stuart was born in Virginia and went to California with his
father and brother Granville in 1852. In 1857 he returned 
to Montana with Granville, joined the firm of Dance, Stuart 
and Company and became superintendent for the St. Louis 
and Montana Mining Company. He left the Company prior to 
the reorganization of 18?2, became an Indian post trader 
and died at Ft. Peck, Montana in 1873.
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Gram/ille Stuart, as mentioned above, came to Montana in 1̂ 57,
returning from California. In I870 he purchased James 
Stuart’s interest in the mercantile business and then 
sold the business in 1873• For three years he was en­
gaged in mining ventures and then became a stockholder 
and bookkeeper at the First National Bank of Helena.
After a short time in Helena, he managed a large ranch­
ing venture at Ft, Maginnis, Montana for himself, Hauser, 
and A. J. Davis of Butte. He served on the Territorial 
Council in 18?2 and in the Territorial House in 1%7S and 
and 1879. In I89I, after his cattle business had failed, 
he became State Land Agent under Governor Hauser and in 
I89U was appointed envoy extraordinary and minister pleni­
potentiary to Uruguay and Paraguay. In 190U he became 
librarian at Butte and was commissioned to write a state 
history of Montana in I916. The work was not completed 
when he died October 2, 1918.
Samuel Treat was a judge of the U. S. District Court.
B. Other Stockholders of the St. Louis and Montana Mining Company and
Closely Related Corporations
Gerard B. Allen was with the Fulton Iron Works.
S. M. Breckenridge was a collector of customs and former judge of 
the St. Louis circuit court.
J. H. Britton was president of the Old State Bank of Missouri and 
former cashier of the Southern Bank.
Amos Cotling was associated with Jameson, Cotling and Company of 
St. Louis and Cotling and Smith of New York.
C. K. Dickson was a member of the firm of Murdock and Dickson,
Dwight Durkee was a banker,
James B. Eads was a constructor and inventor of gun boats, chief 
engineer of the St. Louis Bridge Company, part owner of 
the Granby lead mines, and a director of the National 
Bank of Missouri.
William L. Ewing was a former president of the Merchant’s Bank and 
a member of William L. Ewing and Company.
L. C. Gamier’s other business affiliations are unknown.
James Harrison was with the firm of Chouteau, Harrison and Valle 
and the Rolling Mills.
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D. A, January was with the firm of D. A. January and Company.
John S. McCune was a former member of the Gaty, McCune and Glasby 
foundry, president of the Iron Mountain Company, and 
associated with the Keokuk Packet Company and the Pitts­
burg Coal Company.
Felix McArdle was a metallurgist and assayist.
J. J. O'*Fallon’s other business interests are unknown.
Captain A. M. Pike was a large stock dealer and former head of a 
banking house in Pike County, Missouri.
F. Ringeling was cashier of the Franklin Savings Institution.
M. Steitz was probably a relative of Agustus Steitz.
G. Taussig was a member of Taussig, Livingstone and Company.
M, Taussig was with the firm of Ahles and Taussig.
John A. Ubsdell was with the firm of Ubsdell, Parr, and Duncan of 
St. Louis and New York.
E. Y. Ware was with Belcher’s Sugar Refinery.
C. Other Persons Affiliated with the St. Louis and Montana Mining
Company
Philip Deidesheimer was bom in Germany in 1832 and came to Califor­
nia via Cape Horn in l85l where he remained until i860.
He then went to Nevada and there devised a method of 
"square stoping" which allowed removal of deposits in the 
famous Comstock lode. Philipsburg was named for him after 
he came to Montana in 1865 to help Steitz at Montana City. 
After a short time in Montana, Deidesheimer returned to 
California, invested heavily in mining ventures, and lost 
a good deal of money. He then managed a gold mine in 
Colorado for the Robelings. Little is known of his later 
life. For a description of square set stoping, see Robert 
S. Lewis, Elements of Mining (2d ed.; New York; John 
Wiley & Sons, Inc., ipUl), p. 7U-8U.
G. C. Swallow was born in Maryland and educated at Bowdoin College.
He held the positions of professor of geology, chemistry, 
and mineralogy at the University of Missouri, state 
geologist for Missouri, and state geologist for Kansas. 
After working for the St. Louis and Montana Mining Com­
pany, he became the first Inspector of Mines for the State 
of Montana.
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Glossary of Mining Terms
Amalgamation-pan - A pan in which the process of amalgamation or 
combination with mercury is affected. Used in gold and 
silver metallurgy.
Apex - In geology, the top of an anti-clinal fold of strata. This term 
as used in United States Revised Statutes, has been the occa­
sion of much litigation. It is supposed to mean something 
nearly equivalent to outcrop.
Blast furnace - A furnace in which combustion is forced by a current of 
air under pressure, especially for smelting ores. A blast 
furnace is designated as hot-blast or cold-blast according to 
the temperature of the air used for the blast. The furnace 
is usually vertical, but varies greatly in size and shape.
Bullion - Uncoined gold and silver. Base bullion is usually pig lead 
containing little gold or silver.
Claim - The portion of mining ground held under the Federal and local 
laws by one claimant or association, by virtue of one loca­
tion and record. Lode claims, maximum size 600 by 1,500 
feet. Placer claims, 660 by 1,320 feet. A claim is some­
times called a "location."
Concentrator - An apparatus in which, by the aid of water or air and 
specific gravity, mechanical concentration of ores is per­
formed. Also applied to the entire plant containing the 
various concentrating devices, or machinery. A concentra­
tion plant.
Crosscut - A small passageway driven at right angles to the main entry 
to connect it with a parallel entry or air course. Also 
used in Arkansas instead of "breakthrough."
Cupelling furnace - A shaft furnace with a blast, for remelting metals, 
preparatory to casting. Sometimes incorrectly pronounced 
and written Cupelo. Also a shaft furnace built more slightly 
than the ordinary blast furnace, and usually of fire brick, 
hooped or cased with iron.
Drift - A horizontal passage underground. A drift follows the vein, as 
distinguished from a crosscut, which intersects it, or a 
level or gallery, which may do either.
Incline - A shaft not vertical; usually on the dip of a vein.
-89
T
-90-
Level - A horizontal passage or dfirt into or in a mine. It is
customary to work mines by levels at regular intervals in 
depth, numbered in their order below the adit or drainage 
level, if there be one.
Lode - Strictly a fissure in the country-rock filled with mineral;
usually applied to metalliferous lodes. In general miners 
usage, a lode, vein, or ledge is a tabular deposit of valuable 
mineral between definite boundaries. Whether it be a fissure 
formation or not is not always known, and does not affect the 
legal title under the United States Federal and local statutes 
and customs relative lodes. But is must not be a placer, i.e., 
it must consist of quartz or other rock in place and bearing 
valuable mineral.
Patent - An instrument making a conveyance or grant of public lands.
Title in fee, obtained by patent from the United States 
Government, when there has been done an equivalent of $500 
worth of work on or for each mining claim.
Placer - A place where gold is obtained by washing; an alluvial or
glacial deposit, as of sand or gravel, containing particles of 
gold or other valuable mineral. In the United States mining 
law, mineral deposits, not veins in place, are treated as 
placers, so far as locating, holding, and patenting are con­
cerned. Various minerals besides metallic ores have been held 
to fall under this provision, but not coal, oil, or salt.
Raise - A mine shaft driven from below upward; called also upraise,
rise and riser. An opening, like a shaft, made in the back of 
a level to reach a level above.
Shaft - An excavation of limited area compared with its depth, made for 
finding or mining ore or coal, raising water, ore, rock, or 
coal, hoisting and lowering men and material, or ventilating 
undergrouns workings. The term is often specifically applied 
to approximately vertical shafts, as distinguished from an 
incline or inclined shaft.
Sluice box - A wooden trough in which alluvial beds are washed for the 
recovery of gold or tinstone.
Stamp - A heavy pestle raised by steam or other power for crushing ore.
Those stamps in which the blow of the pestle is caused by its
mere weight are called gravity stamps,
Stope - An excavation from which the ore has been extracted, either
above or below a level, in a series of steps, A variation of 
step. Usually applied to highly inclined or vertical veins. 
Frequently used incorrectly as a synonym of room, which is a 
wide working place in a flat mine.
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Tailings - The parts, or a part, of any incoherent or fluid material 
separated as refuse, or separately treated as inferior in 
quality or value; leavings; remainders; drers. In metal­
lurgy, the part rejected in washing an ore that has passed 
through the screens of a stamp-mill; the worthless slimes 
left after the valuable portion has been separated by dres­
sing or concentration. The sand, gravel and cobbles which 
pass through the sluices in hydraulic mining were formerly 
generally designated as tailings, but of late years, espe­
cially in State and United States legislative documents, 
they have been called "mining debris" or simply "debris."
Vein - An occurrence of ore, usually disseminated through a gangue,
or veinstone, and having a more or less regular development 
in length, width, and depth. A vein and a lode are, in 
common usage, essentially the same thing, the former being 
rather the scientific, the latter the miners' name for it.
Winze - A vertical or inclined opening, or excavation, connecting
two levels in a mine, differing from a raise only in con­
struction. A winze is sunk underhand and a raise is put up 
overhand. When the connection is completed, and one is 
standing at the top, the opening is referred to as a winze, 
and when at the bottom, as a raise, or rise.
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